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Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is partly driven by increased Chinese engagement. 
Within the discourse of China’s role in African development, literature argues Chinese 
investments go beyond natural resource extraction, also including manufacturing activities. This 
report contributes to empirical research on Chinese engagement in African economies. It 
investigates the impact Chinese investments in the Zambian textile and clothing (TC) industry 
with regard to economic development in the country. Being one of the most globalised industries 
today; the cotton‐textile-clothing supply chain is usually regarded as the first point of entry into 
industrialisation, and as important for poverty alleviation.  
This study explores growth trends and status of the Zambian TC sector, national parameters to 
build the industry, and factors that impact growth of the TC sector. Furthermore, this study 
investigates incentives for Chinese investments in the TC industry, and maps supportive 
institutions and organisation of Chinese companies in the country. This study highlights how 
Chinese actors improves infrastructural development, which indirectly benefit the TC industry; 
while on the other side discovers policy needs and challenges to expand production and trade of 
Zambian TC goods.   
Despite discussions about broad Chinese investments in the Zambian textile and clothing 
industry, this study identified only two projects of Chinese TC investments in the country. As 
these are not operational, the impact on economic development is obviously limited. Findings 
from this study show that Zambia remains an exporter of cotton, and has little TC industry to 
speak of. Instead, the imports of low-priced TC items cover the majority of the market for TC 
nationally. Overall, this study highlights the challenges to industrialise in the context of a liberal 
market and with the global competitive pressure. Regardless of Chinese involvement or interest, 
insufficient framework conditions in Zambia have prevented the TC industry from being 
profitable. Zambian leaders therefore will need to provide strategic plans and direction for 
foreign investors, channel investments into priority sectors of the economy, and overall ensure 
poverty alleviation through creating acceptable employment. 
This discussion paper is based on research conducted and presented as part of a Master degree 
of Arts (International Studies) at Stellenbosch University. Primary data was collected in Lusaka, 
Zambia in June 2011, consisting of semi-structures interviews with employees within the 
Zambian cotton-textile-garment industry (5); academics at research institutions and the 
University of Zambia (5); Zambian government officials (3); and interest organisations (3). In 
addition, observations while being in Lusaka have fed into the report. Secondary information 
include news articles on the topic, and publications gathered from institutions in Zambia, such as 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Centre for Trade Policy and Development, the Zambia Business 
Forum, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka and the Zambian government. Furthermore, 
academic data from scholarly journals, conference papers, books and policy papers was utilised, 
processing the state of the literature until April 2012. This paper was written as part of an 
internship at the Centre for Chinese Studies. Any mistakes or lack of clarity is to blame entirely 
on the author.  
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ACCZ  Association for Chinese Corporations in Zambia 
AGOA  African Growth and Opportunity Act 
AU  African Union 
BOC  Bank of China 
CAMI  Conference of African Ministers of Industry 
CADFund China‐Africa Development Fund 
CDB  China Development Bank 
CmiA  Cotton made in Africa 
CNMC  China Nonferrous Metals Corporation 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
CSOZ  Central Statistical Office Zambia 
CTPD  Centre for Trade Policy and Development 
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo 
EAC  East African Community 
EBA  Everything but Arms 
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement 
EU  European Union 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FNDP  Fifth National Development Plan 
FOCAC  Forum of China- Africa Cooperation 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HIPC  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
ICBC  Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  
IMF  International Money Fund  
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
 ISI  Import Substitution Industrialisation    
JCTR  Jesuit College of Theological Reflection   
 LDC  Least Developed Country  
LINCO  Lint Company of Zambia             
MCTI  Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry 
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MFA  Multi Fibre Agreement    
MFEZ  Multi Facility Economic Zone   
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce    
MSMEs  Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises   
NEPAD  New Economic Partnership for African Development  
NICs  Newly Industrialised Countries  
NTE  Non traditional export    
NUCIW  National Union for Commercial and Industrial Workers 
ODA  Official development assistance  
PACRO  Patents and Company Registration Office  
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
PSDRP  Private Sector Development Reform Programme  
RATES  Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support Programme  
SADC   Southern African Development Community   
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme  
SNDP  Sixth National Development Plan  
SOE  State Owned Enterprise   
SSA  Sub Saharan Africa   
TAZARA Tanzania Zambia Railway 
TC  Textile and Clothing  
TPZ  Textile Producers of Zambia 
TRIMs  Trade-Related Investment Measures 
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
UN-OHRLLS United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing countries and the Small Island Developing States 
UNZA University of Zambia 
USD  United States Dollar 
USITC  United States International Trade Commission 
VAT  Value Added Tax 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
Zamtel  Zambia Telecommunications Company 
ZBF  Zambia Business Forum 
ZCCZ  Zambia China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone 
ZCMT  Zambia China Mulungushi Textiles 
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ZCMTU  Zambia China Mulungushi Textiles Union 
ZCSMBA Zambia Chamber of Small and Medium Business Association 
ZDA  Zambian Development Agency 
ZIPAR  Zambian Institute for Policy Analysis and Research 
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Within the African development discourse, recent literature argues that without a growing 
industrial sector, African economies will find it increasingly difficult to sustain growth and to 
participate fully in global economic activity (Page, 2010:4; UNIDO, 2009). From 1990 to 2007 
Africa remained outside the greatest expansion of manufacturing production and export by 
developing countries in (world) history (ibid). The level of industrialisation remains low, 
industry is technological backwards, leaving an industrial revolution to lie in the future for most 
of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004:3; UNIDO, 2009:120,121; 
Brautigam, 2009:230). African countries need to take a fresh look at industrial development, as 
they are dependent on market access to create the number of jobs needed to ensure sustainable 
livelihood for their people and to reduce poverty (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004:3; Brautigam, 
2009). In this way, industrialisation is considered a precondition to participate in the global 
economy and necessary for economic growth and development.  
Western countries1 give little assistance to manufacturing industries in Africa, which potentially 
could provide thousands of jobs (Brautigam, 2009:91,92). Not unrelated, aid for the past sixty 
years is often criticised as an effective tool for development and for poverty reduction (Moyo, 
2009; Brautigam, 2009). Chinese development assistance, for its part, includes commitment to 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and industry. The Chinese government seek to build strategic 
economic relations with African countries, as part of South-South cooperation, for resources, 
markets and political backing in its global rise (Grimm, 2011). Recent debates argue that Chinese 
engagement in African countries no longer is confined to natural resource extraction, as a 
significant proportion of FDI from Chinese actors go to manufacturing and service activities 
(Asche and Schüller, 2008:28; Cissé, 2012).  
Through the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the overarching institution 
coordinating China-Africa relations, the Chinese government encourages and promotes overseas 
activities of Chinese actors. These actors comprise state-owned enterprises (SOE), the private 
sector and individuals, and are supported by strong state policies and institutions to foster 
domestic development in China (Baah and Jauch, 2009b). By restructuring the domestic 
economy and providing incentives for mature industries to move overseas, the Chinese 
government aims to shift labour intensive and less competitive industrial activities such as 
textile and clothing (TC) manufacturing abroad (Brautigam, 2009:91). In 2006, the Chinese 
government established a special fund for Chinese textile companies to encourage them to move, 
while costs for producers who stayed in China increased (ibid). The same year, the decision to 
build economic zones in African countries was announced at FOCAC (Qiang, 2010:63). Chinese 
leaders see economic zones as important measures to help African countries develop industries 
and expand local employment, nonetheless, Chinese enterprises also set up industrial zones 
outside the Ministry of Commerce2 (MOFCOM) programme (Brautigam and Tang, 2011:28). The 
Chinese government see their experience with industrialisation and open door to foreign 
investments, as partly responsible for their remarkable reduction in poverty (Brautigam, 
2009:193). In this way, the Chinese government has shown some sensitivity to the negative 
impacts that trade in Chinese manufactured goods has on African industry, with initiatives to 
promote local industries in some African countries (Baah and Jauch, 2009a:50).  
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The TC sector, as light industry located under the manufacturing sector, is considered to be the 
first step into industrialisation (Gereffi, 1999; Kamau, 2010). Historically, the first phase of the 
industrial revolution in the West, from around 1780s, started with textile industry in North 
England; creating new production patterns and economic links between people (Hobson, 20043). 
Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in East Asia have also shown an industrialisation process 
sparked by economic zones and labour-intensive assembly of imported inputs, especially in the 
TC industry (Gereffi, 1999; Kamau, 2010). In this way, the TC industry is considered to be a great 
choice for least developed countries (LDCs) entry into industrialisation, as it offers excellent 
starter opportunities for growth and development for at least three reasons.  
First, the industry is important for employment creation. As a typical light industry the TC 
industry is labour intensive, has low capital requirements, and spend little on research and 
development (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004; Kamau, 2010:109). The industry is capable of 
absorbing large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, it costs little to create one 
formal job in the sector, and in comparison to much of African industry, which tends to be 
dominated by men, the TC industry offers employment opportunities for both men and women 
(ibid). Offering employment opportunities and incorporating women into the economy will 
impact poverty levels in a positive way (Keane and te Velde, 2008; Thomas, 2005).  
Secondly, the TC industry is important for transfer for skills and technology. The industry offers 
significant learning opportunities for unskilled and skilled workers, with potential to upgrade to 
more sophisticated goods (Brautigam, 2009; Gereffi, 1999). Contact with foreign firms can serve 
as a role model, and offer opportunity for skill transfer and subcontracting. The demand the TC 
industry creates for backwards and forwards links in the economy, such as for cotton farming, 
ginning, spinning, weaving, designers, garment manufacturing, shops and so on, has obvious 
benefits to skills and employment creation in a national economy, and offer opportunities for 
industrial clusters or links (Kamau, 2010; Brautigam, 2009). Although, the TC sector is a global 
industry, activities of production are carried out in a local context and therefore affect local and 
national economies. 
A third reason for choosing the TC industry for growth and development for LDCs, relate to the 
potential for trade and export earnings from TC goods. From 1974 TC exports were negotiated 
bilaterally and governed by the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) through a system of quota and 
preferences for textile and clothing producing countries (Nordås, 2004:13,14). With the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, after the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations (1986 ‐1994), textile trade was brought under jurisdiction of the WTO with 
the decision to gradually dismantle the MFA (ibid). The MFA expired 1 January 2005, meaning 
liberalisation of the global TC industry (van Dijk, 2009b:167; Brautigam, 2009:216). In light of 
changes in global trading rules, Western countries grants preferential market access to support 
TC production and economic development in LDCs; the European Union (EU) through 
Everything But Arms (EBA) and USA through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
Regionally, trade agreements within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) offer opportunities for 
African countries such as Zambia to develop through trade in manufactured TC products. 
Chinese engagement in African countries has intensified the last decade, through channels of aid, 
loans, FDI and trade. Although, there are critics highlighting the threats of economic relations 
with Chinese actors, regarding implications of debt and ownership (Dubosse, 2010; Huse and 
Mwuyakwa, 2008), environmental repercussions (Kabemba, 2010; Brautigam, 2009), and trade 
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in Chinese goods undermining export-oriented industrialisation in Africa (Kaplinsky et al 2008; 
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008; Carmody 2009); the relationship offer opportunity for African 
countries to industrialise (Brautigam, 2009; Cheru and Obi, 2010; Kragelund, 2009b; Carmody 
and Hampwaye, 2010). African countries are scarce in capital and thus dependent on FDI to 
industrialise and develop their manufacturing sectors (Brautigam, 2009; Kragelund, 2009a). In 
context of reduced aid from traditional donors and the changing modalities of aid, FDI from non-
traditional development partners as China has become an important driver for development 
agenda’s in African countries (Baah and Jauch, 2009b; Kragelund, 2012, Kragelund, 2008). As, 
FDI does not automatically lead to economic growth and poverty reduction, and since there is no 
single “Chinese model” for economic cooperation; it is up to African leaders to ensure 
institutions and policies to reap the benefit of FDI (Brautigam, 2009; van der Lugt et al, 2011).  
This paper takes Zambia as a case, a landlocked country at the centre of the SADC, categorised as 
one of the least developed countries (LDCs) in the world4. Zambia was reclassified from being a 
low-income country to a lower-middle income country in 2011, against the background of high 
economic growth, due to Chinese demand for copper and favourable prices for metals on the 
world market (Bretton Woods Project, 14 September, 2011). Despite upgrade, the informal 
sector, the poverty levels and inequality are rampant5 (Carmody, 2009; Muneku, 2009:164). 
As this study is based on field research there are obvious limitations to the study. These relate to 
language obstacles, cultural differences, identification of sources of information and lack of 
updated numbers and research in Zambia. Interviews include Zambian nationals, in government, 
academia, civil society and the TC industry, and not Chinese actors in Zambia6. It is important to 
acknowledge that this study discusses the development impact of Chinese FDI in one specific 
sector of the Zambian economy, the TC industry, and therefore does not aspire to grasp the 
impact of Chinese FDI on a national scale. The Zambian TC industry was struggling prior to the 
rise of Chinese investments in the country, and status of the industry needs to be seen in context 
of the domestic and international environment.  
Chinese investments in manufacturing projects in Zambia offer opportunity for industrialisation, 
but yet we know little about impact on specific sectors, such as the TC industry. After having 
provided some background on Zambia, the subsequent part of this study will explain the 
importance of light industrial development for LDCs, and how TC industry is especially relevant 
for employment creation, skill transfer and market creation. Part three will explore the state of 
the Zambian TC industry and market access for Zambian TC products, before investigating how 
the Zambian government aims to build the sector, through looking at national plans and 
institutions in place to foster economic development in the country. The last section of part 
three, highlight and discusses contextual factors impacting growth of the TC industry. Part four 
asks if Chinese investors are the rescuer of the Zambian TC industry. Through looking at 
motivations for establishing TC industry in Zambia, supportive institutions for investors, and 
through examining Chinese companies within the TC sector, this study seek to answer how 
Chinese investments in the Zambian TC industry impacts economic development.  
1.1. Background on Zambia 
Historically, Zambia is a mono-economy built around mining of minerals such as copper and 
cobalt. To reduce dependence on the mining sector, the country faces challenges to diversify the 
economic base and to strengthen other sectors of the economy (Brenthurst Foundation, 2010). 
The Zambian agricultural sector is abundantly endowed with resources needed to stimulate 
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national economic growth and rural development. With a good climate, an abundance of arable 
land, labour availability and excellent water resources, one of Zambia’s major cash crops 
includes cotton (Naumann, 2002). Cotton is the primary input of the TC value chain, which 
shows the potential TC industry has to contribute to employment creation and poverty 
alleviation in the country. 
The manufacturing sector was significantly built up through national plans from 1964 to 1971, 
and through Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) profit from mining was used to subsidise 
state-owned manufacturing companies and consumers (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:7; Saasa and 
Carlson, 2002). Through developing Zambia’s potential, President Kaunda created jobs in the 
state-owned mines, where workers were supported by “cradle to grave” welfare policies7, which 
included high wages, houses, education and health care (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:8). Ferguson 
(1999) describes the socialist labour regime under Kaunda, as following a “myth” if modernity, a 
social context of imagining the nation as moving forward. The real Zambianisation of the 
economy did not last long, with international copper prices deteriorating through the financial 
crises of the 1970s, the foreign debt burden increased (Kragelund, 2009a:647).  By 1973/74 
Zambia accepted its first conditioned loan from the International Money Fund (IMF), given to 
finance government expenditures (Fraser and Lungu, 2007:9). Debt led to substantial external 
influence on development plans in Zambia, where the World Bank introduced Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) from 1983 (Tandon, 2008:45). These aimed to correct 
imbalances of government spending, increase revenue and raise the productive potential of 
Africa economies (Kragelund, 2009b:489). By 1984, Zambia had become one of the most 
indebted countries in the world relative to its size (Saasa and Carlson, 2002:39). Aid8 was given 
to cushion the social and economic impacts of adjustment (Fraser, 2007:6). By the 1990s the 
Zambian national budget had become more than 40 per cent donor dependent (ibid). This 
signalled significant influence over national plans both by international financial institutions and 
Western donors. SAPs were followed by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000, 
which introduced a new system of aid negotiation, based on including stakeholders beyond the 
Zambian government, namely civil society and donors in the domestic policy process (Larmer, 
2007:25,26). Furthermore, due to incentives of debt reduction, through the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Counties (HIPC) Initiative from 1996 to 2006, Zambia reinforced liberal policies and 
privatisation. As no vibrant private sector stepped into the vacuum left by privatisation, the 
effects were de-industrialisation, unemployment and poverty (Fraser and Lungu, 2007; 
McCullough et al., 2000). 
Since mid-2000, Zambia has enacted a number of reforms to foster economic development and 
to improve the investment climate through the Private Sector Development Reform Programme 
(PSDRP) (Chisala, 2008:13). Despite some improvements in recent years, Zambia has challenges 
with contextual factors on the supply side such as poor infrastructure, policy inconsistence, 
weak institutions, corruption and limited credit available for the productive sector (Brenthurst 
Foundation, 2010; van der Lugt et al, 2011).  The most important financial flows to Zambia are 
FDI, official development assistance (ODA) and from trade (Ndulo et al, 2009:27). The Zambian 
economy stabilised by 2008 and began to reap the benefit of readjustment; showing to nine 
years with positive economic growth; reduced foreign debt burden; almost ten-fold increase in 
FDI between 2000 and 2008; and four-fold growth in total export between 2002 to 2008 
(Brenthurst Foundation, 2010).  
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With improved economic management and macroeconomic stability, rising copper prices, and 
external support from bilateral and multilateral donors, the financial crisis in 2008 set in, just as 
Zambia was getting optimistic about prospects of economic growth and poverty alliviation 
(Ndulo et al, 2009). Both trade and donor support to the national budget are affected by the 
financial crisis, which threatens to undermine the process of resolving issues of employment 
creation and poverty reduction (Kragelund, 2012; Reuters Africa, 9 October 2010; Ndulo et al, 
2009:49). How well Zambia will do out of the crisis, depends on the ability to diversify the 
economy, by spreading economic dependence beyond the mining sector. This indicates the 
importance of financial mechanisms as FDI9 for Zambia’s economic development, and filling gaps 
in the national economy through doing business.  
1.2. Chinese investments in Zambia 
Due to historical ties through diplomacy and aid relations10, the liberal investment climate and 
natural resources, Zambia has become a preferred destination for Chinese goods and 
investments. Studies looking at the development impact of Chinese trade, aid, loans and FDI in 
Zambia have in recent years received more attention from scholars, media and civil society. This 
paper will focus on impact of investments, but not unrelated start with the impact of Chinese 
trade on national industrial development. 
From 2000 to 2010 bilateral trade grew from USD 108 million to USD 2.85 billion, leaving China 
to become the second-largest destination for Zambian copper export by the end of 2010 (Alves, 
2011:1). Although, increased bilateral trade has positive aspects, it also causes negative impact 
on national industry for at least two reasons. Firstly, the appreciation of the Kwacha due to 
Chinese demand and import of copper, have had a negative effect on Zambian exports such as 
textiles, as it made textiles more expensive in major markets (Asche and  chu ller, 2008 6 ; 
United States International Trade Commission, USITC, 2009:4-75). This is referred to as Dutch 
Disease, where appreciation of a local currency causes a series of side effects for other industries 
that compete in the export market (ibid). Secondly, Chinese export of cheap consumer goods 
such as textiles and clothes undermines export-oriented industrialisation in Zambia (Carmody, 
2009). Most countries in SSA will be largely excluded from the global market and face significant 
threats to their domestic markets without trade preferences over Asia, as the biggest producer 
of TC products (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008). In this way, the Zambian economy may become 
jammed in a mercantilist cycle11 with China, by exporting raw materials and importing back 
finished goods (Carmody and Hampwaye, 2010:97).   
In the 2000s Chinese actors become an important source for FDI in Zambia; the majority 
channelled through state-own enterprises (SOEs), concentrated in sectors such as mining, 
mining related activities and in infrastructure (Carmody, 2010; Haglund, 2008; Koyi and 
Kamwanga, 2009; Petersen and van der Lugt 2010; Kragelund, 2009b). Chinese actors are now 
located in all sectors of the economy (such as manufacturing, agriculture, technology, energy 
supply and telecommunications) (Kragelund, 2009a: 649; Alves, 2011). In 2006, the Chinese 
government announced intentions of supporting and building economic zones in Zambia, where 
the Zambia government in 2007 passed Multi Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) regulations 
providing incentives and legislation for industrial activity in the country. This might be good 
news for industrial development in Zambia. 
Compared to state-owned investments in mining and construction sectors, the literature argues 
that smaller and privately owned investments from China will become more frequent and 
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important in the future, although, some of it should be discouraged as it might cause 
displacement of local producers (Kragelund, 2009b; Carmody and Hampaye, 2010). Most Asian 
companies in Zambia are located in the manufacturing sector (Carmody and Hampwaye, 
2010:90). To this date little is said about the interface between Chinese investments and the 
impact on specific sectors of the economy (Kaplinsky et al 2008; Haglund, 2008:548). This paper 
seeks to investigate whether China is effectively contributing to sustainable development in 
Zambia or if China’s primary concern is to access Africa’s raw materials and open up new 
markets (Asche and Schüller, 2008). Furthermore, it is of interest to explore what Chinese actors 
in Zambia does to change the negative impact their manufactured goods has on African TC 
industry, through building the Zambian TC industry, and thereby accepting its responsibility for 
Zambian development (Grimm, 2011). Research that look at the socio-economic effects on the 
ground of Chinese engagement in African economies are seen as essential to develop guidelines, 
recommendations and policies to improve prospects for economic development.  
The “World Report” by Human Rights Watch, shows governments at an international level tend 
to use a quiet approach to human rights abuses (Roth, 2011). The shifting global balance of 
power with the rise of China, intensified competition for markets and resources at a time of 
economic crisis and declining moral standing for Western powers, have made many 
governments less willing to publicly be in favour of human rights (ibid). At a national level, 
impact of Chinese investments continue to fuel debate regarding poor labour standards; 
investments not being linked to national priorities; and does not trickle down to the majority of 
Zambians (Mwanawina, 2008; Taylor and Carmody, 2010; Fraser and Lungu, 2007). Kragelund 
(2009:646) adds, what triggers the debate in Zambia is not FDI in itself, but a combination of 
domestic politics, and the real and perceived role of Chinese investors in the Zambian economy. 
For the sake of feasibility and because development is a contested concept, economic 
development in this paper is defined by the following four elements: (i) formal employment 
creation, (ii) skill and technology transfer, (iii) improved state revenue, and (iv) market creation.  
To clarify central concepts, raw cotton or cotton seed is the purest form of cotton, then 
transformed through ginning to cotton lint (Bennett et al 2011; Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). 
Spinning machines process cotton lint to yarn, which further is inserted into knitting or weaving 
activity to make fabric (ibid). The textile industry is capital intensive, as transformation of yarn 
to fabric requires an industrial process. The three activities: spinning, weaving and finishing, are 
often undertaken in integrated plants (Nordås, 2004). In order to be internationally competitive, 
investments in textile industry is necessary, and in many cases access to modern technology is a 
bottleneck in the production chain, and what separates developing countries, dependent on 
natural resources, with industrialised countries (ibid). The clothing sector is less capital 
intensive, but highly labour intensive in the sense that it absorbs unskilled labour and does not 
require expensive machinery or technology. The three concepts: clothes, apparel and garments, 
are made from textiles, and will in this paper be used synonymously.  
 
2. Manufacturing industry and development 
2.1. Manufacturing and light industry matters 
Africa holds a great share of the world’s natural resources, but most economies are dominated 
by mining or plantation activities. Manufacturing is essentially about creating added value to 
natural resources, which will contribute to a higher base of income for a country. Countries with 
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more diversified production and export structures have higher income per capita (Imbs and 
Wacziarg, 2003; Carrére et al, 2007; UNIDO, 2009; Page, 2010; Hausmann et al, 2007). The 
manufacturing sector is of specific importance to developing countries if it uses light industry to 
absorb employees, in contrast to industrialised countries, using high technology to reduce the 
labour numbers (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004). African countries with natural resources and 
a pool of unskilled labour should according to trade theory be expected to produce what 
currently (has been) is imported (Sandrey and Edinger, 2011:7). 
A set of factors impacts the speed and level of industrialisation in LDCs. The business 
environment are often characterised by features as: small market size, limited infrastructure, 
poor governance and legal systems, lack of human capital, lack of access to manufactured inputs 
and price volatility (Tybout, 2000:13). In landlocked countries such as Zambia, the lack of ports 
also adds to the price for food and fuel, which also impact prices for trade (USITC, 2009). These 
factors illustrate the importance of long term industrial policies, which aims to link investments 
to the needs in the domestic economy. 
2.2.  Textile and clothing industries and development 
2.2.1. The cotton-textile-garment supply chain 
As illustrated in Table 1, the cotton-textile-garment value chain consists of: cotton farming, 
ginning plants make cotton lint, cotton lint is spun to yarn, yarn is transformed to fabric through 
weaving and knitting, fabric is then dyed or printed to finished textiles, lastly textiles is used for 
garment manufacturing before it is ready for sale (Zambia Development Agency, ZDA, 2008).  




Source: Own illustration based on Schneider (2010:9) 
Cotton is the primary input for the TC industry, and appropriate for African countries 
industrialisation effort when the industry can make use of local resources (Brautigam, 
2009:195). The importance of cotton, both for poverty alleviation at the household level and in 
terms of sustainable development cannot be overemphasised. Zambia has a comparative 
advantage in TC manufacturing, as cotton is the most significant cash crop for farmers (Bennett 
et al, 2011). Zambian cotton is grown in rain-fed conditions, making it more sustainable than in 
countries using irrigation (Peltzer, 2011). The crop is grown by small-scale farmers, who use 
less pesticides compared to large cotton plantations (ibid). Cotton can be used (also in 
combination with synthetic fibres) to make woven or knitted fabrics for clothing production 
(McCormick and Rogerson, 2004:4). Since the end of 2009, significant price increases for cotton 
on the world market have pushed cotton prices higher, making cotton attractive to African 
smallholders (Peltzer, 2011). 95 per cent of African cotton farmers have an income of less than 
USD 1.5 a day, which makes cotton a key in fighting poverty in Africa (ibid). In the early stages of 
development and industrialisation, the TC industry provides opportunities for diversification 
away from agriculture and export of raw materials, to export of value-added products (Kamau, 
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agricultural sector, although it is lower than in other manufacturing activities (Keane and te 
Velde, 2008:16).  
The TC industry is especially important for economic development as it stimulates for 
backwards and forward links in different sectors of the national economy and benefit local 
economies (Brautigam, 2009:194). Textile production creates demand for cotton and clothing 
production, and offer opportunities for subcontracting, with potential for employment creation 
for small-scale producers (Kamau, 2010:110). The TC industry creates forward links in the 
economy by providing goods for national traders and shops, and through export of TC products 
to regional and international markets. Both textile and garments are located under non-
traditional export (NTE) products, which are trade-intensive in the international economy, 
implying there is a great potential for international trade, which can contribute to foreign 
exchange earnings, FDI and technological transfer (Brautigam, 2009).  
2.2.2.  The TC industry- an entry into industrialisation for LDCs 
The TC industry is a typical starter industry for countries engaged in export-oriented 
industrialisation, and perceived as one of the strategic industries within the manufacturing 
sector spearheading the early stages of the development process, as it has played a central role 
in the industrial revolution in the West, and more recently in NICs industrialisation process 
(Kamau, 2010; McCormick and Rogerson, 2004). The clothing industry is one of the oldest and 
largest export industries in the world (Gereffi, 1999). Clothing has become an increasing part of 
our social world, as clothes represent a symbol of status, age, interest, geographic location, 
identity and so on (Ferguson, 1999; Hansen, 2000). One of the effects of globalisation is 
increased demand for lower priced fashion clothing and TC goods fitted markets in all societies. 
Most nations produce for the international TC industry; making it the most global of all 
industries (Dickerson, 1995:6; cited in Gereffi, 1999:40).  
African leaders have recognised the need for appropriate policies to improve national, regional 
and global links, as economic performance since 1995 has improved (Page, 2010:2). At a 
regional level, the New Partnership for African Development’s (NEPAD’s) objective under the 
African Union (AU), is to increase production and improve the competitiveness and 
diversification of domestic private sectors (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004:4). The Conference 
of African Ministers of Industry (CAMI) with support of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) has identified textile and garments as one of three sub-
sectors in a regional capacity building initiative (ibid). At a national level, the TC sector in 
Zambia is the fifth priority sector where the Zambian government provide incentives to attract 
foreign investors (Fifth National Development Plan, FNDP, 2006).  
Based on literature on the topic, three main areas are identified where industrialisation through 
the TC sector impacts local economic development, namely through: (i) employment creation, 
(ii) skill and technology transfer, and (iii) through the market potential created by trade in these 
products.  
2.2.2.1. Employment 
The TC industry is a significant candidate for the industrialisation effort in developing countries, 
as the sector has low capital requirements and high labour intensity (McCormick and Rogerson, 
2004). Particularly with regards to labour intensity, the TC industry provides an avenue for 
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employment creation for semi and unskilled labour, found in abundance in LDCs (Kamau, 
2010:109).  
As the labour markets in developing countries are dominated by informal employment, TC 
employment provides a major opportunity to receive formal wage employment (Keane and te 
Velde, 2008:16). Ordinary people benefit both through opportunities of formal wage 
employment and through rising wages. It is also worth adding that by increasing the number of 
formally employed workers, the government increases its income base by collecting tax rents, 
which can be used for further economic development. Moreover, formal wage employment is 
more secure and offer more scope for skill accumulation than self-employment or informal wage 
work (UNIDO, 2009:7). This may be particularly important for gender equality, as labour-
intensive industries are a key source of wage employment for women.  
The TC industry offers African countries job opportunities for both men and women (McCormick 
and Rogerson, 2004:5). Employment creation has been strong for women in poor countries in 
the TC industry, which is of importance as previously women had no income opportunities other 
than the household or in the informal sector (Nordås, 2004; Keane and te Velde, 2008:28). The 
cost of globalisation is spread unevenly, where feminization of poverty refers to the growing 
proportion of women and their children living in poverty (Pettman, 2005:676). As women 
everywhere are overwhelmingly responsible for family and household maintenance, cut backs of 
state services in social sectors (as suggested by the World Bank and IMF), has especially affected 
women’s employment possibilities in developing countries. Although, women compared to men 
are more likely to be informally employed, be on temporary or subcontract level, less paid, and 
work at lower skill and value added sections of the TC value chain; offering women formal 
employment will benefit the local economy, through strengthening women’s economic role and 
transforming social structures (Keane and te Velde, 2008:31; Thomas, 2005). According to 
UNIDO (2009:xiv) in places where the manufacturing sector does not develop, women have 
fewer opportunities to gain economic status. Nearly 75 per cent of workers in the TC industry 
globally are women, whose income-earning opportunities have far-reaching effect on household 
and poverty reduction (Kamau, 2010:109). 
A traditional economic view is that labour abundant countries have a comparative advantage in 
garment assembly as they can compete on lower wages (Keane and te Velde, 2008:16). Jobs in 
the TC sector currently fail to meet the full potential for poverty alleviation, owing to precarious 
employment conditions; although wages still form an essential part of workers livelihood and 
make enormous contribution to family income (Oxfam, 2004:7,8). The early stages of 
industrialisation are almost universally dirty, machinery is frequently unsafe, accidents occur 
and working conditions are characterised by long hours and few rights (Brautigam 2009:191; 
Blankert, 2009). Also seen in China, wage levels for workers in the TC industry tend to be low 
and without formal employment benefits (Baah and Jauch, 2009b). Brautigam (2009:191,193) 
argues the transition from low to higher income occurs through a sustained period of industrial 
transition, upgrading and through creating industrial linkages. Furthermore, Van der Lugt et al 
(2011:35) underline that the shift towards a more multi-polar world and due to international 
requirements and regulations being established mainly by actors in the West, it is suggested that 
these standards and requirements might need revision.12 This argument highlight the important 
role African governments have to ensure acceptable and poverty reducing employment. 
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2.2.2.2. Skills and technology 
Investments in TC industry offer potential for transfer of skills and technology; presenting 
African countries with significant learning opportunities. Contacts with foreign firms can 
catalyse local industry, serve as a role model and foreign companies might subcontract parts of 
their work to local firms (Brautigam, 2009:193). In this way, contacts with foreign firms might 
provide workers in the TC industry with ideas, feedback and help to meet the standard 
demanded, and thereby spin of waves of innovation (ibid). Through industrial contracting and 
subcontracting between local and foreign manufacturers, the learning opportunities are bigger 
(Gereffi, 1999:40). Spill-over tend to happen where industrial clusters of firms of the same type 
gather, since proximity speed the mobility of ideas, input and labour (Brautigam, 2009:194). 
Also, competition in local markets might push local companies to invest in new technologies and 
improve quality; if the competition does not drive them out of business first (ibid).  
The ability to catalyse industrialisation is affected by the local skill level and the technological 
gap. Countries with a higher share of their population receiving tertiary education also have a 
lower share of TC exports as part of total manufactured exports (Keane and te Velde, 2008:22). 
Whereas, countries with a high proportion of primary enrolment rates compared to secondary 
and tertiary enrolment, have a high share of TC exports as share of total manufactured goods 
(ibid). This signals the potential relevance of TC for the group of LDCs, where Zambia is located, 
as the majority of the population is limited to primary education (UNDP, 2011). Although Tybout 
(2000:14,15) adds, low rates of secondary education, scarcity of technicians and scientists, will 
affect the goods manufactured and the ability to absorb new technology.  
Nevertheless, with a significant technology gap and low degree of formal education, the TC 
industry which is based on low-tech and basic skills, provides African countries with significant 
learning opportunities, as employees can self-attain the knowledge needed to do the job. If the 
level of technology is not too advanced, a foreign-owned factory can serve as a role model. Skills 
can spill-over from foreign firms when their local employees leave, taking skills they attained 
from the job to other companies or starting their own firms (Brautigam, 2009:193). It is worth 
to note that spill-over of skills and technology will be more likely when a foreign firm is away 
from its home base, as transport costs and convenience will give an incentive to source more 
input locally (Brautigam, 2009:194). 
In the context of growing openness of African economies to global competition, both in domestic 
and export markets, the sustained expansion of a growth-enhancing clothing sector depends on 
its capacity to upgrade (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001; Brautigam, 
2003). Upgrading, essentially means improvement in process efficiency, including new 
embodied technologies, new forms of organisation within the firm and throughout the chain 
(ibid). The product upgrading relates to the degree of complexity and value added, the 
introduction of new products and product variety (Kaplinsky and Wamae, 2010:4). 
Technological processes require labour to adapt, learn new skills and take on jobs that may not 
have existed before (Blankert, 2009). As the TC industry is labour intensive, it provides an 
important avenue to attain skills for workers, to upgrade and develop higher level of skills 
through experience. 
2.2.2.3. Market access and trade 
A third reason for building the TC industry in LDC’s industrialisation process, relate to export 
potential and trade in TC products. In most African countries, the domestic market is simply too 
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small to sustain efficient production. Regional trade and markets hold some promise, but in 
many cases the country's neighbours have equally low purchasing power and are similarly 
flooded with cheap imports (Brautigam, 2009). Production only for the export market, will give 
less benefit for local economic development. To stimulate national and local economic 
development, a country needs to produce for the domestic market at a minimum, so it gives a 
trickle-down effect to other sectors of the economy, contributes to better income-earnings, tax 
revenue, skill upgrading and to overall national economic development. For maximum benefit 
and to industrialise, African countries need to combine export production to regional and 
international markets with production for local and national markets (McCormick and Rogerson, 
2004:3,4). 
Global trade in TC rose throughout the 1980s and 1990s; the 1997 level was 182 per cent over 
the 1980 level (McCormick and Rogerson, 2004:4,5; ILO, 2000). The UNIDO report (2009:114) 
shows that while global manufactured trade continue to be concentrated within the developed 
world, South-South trade has increased its share in world trade by four per cent in only five 
years, accounting for 14.5 per cent of global trade in 2009. Trade in manufactured goods within 
the developing world grew at 16 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2005; double the pace 
of manufactured trade between high-income countries (ibid). The shifting patterns of export 
indicate that there is room for new countries to join the ranks of exporters, especially in the less 
industrialised world. 
Changes in global trading rules and trade agreements have brought new opportunities for 
African countries to export to regional and international markets, and to develop through trade. 
The TC industry was liberalised with the ending of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) of quotas in 
2005 under the WTO. USA and the EU imposed temporarily restrictions against TC products 
from Asia up until late 2008, as the termination of the MFA resulted in a surge of imports mainly 
from China (Brautigam, 2009:216). Through preferential trade agreements with developing 
countries internationally, USA and EU aims to increase trade through duty-free and quota-free 
entry of selected goods into their markets through two similar programmes, AGOA and EBA, as a 
tool for poverty reduction. EBA and AGOA can therefore be seen as incentives to develop the TC 
industry in less industrialised countries. Regionally, COMESA and SADC offer incentives to 
improve regional trade and regional industrial links, through free trade agreements and 
preferential access to Zambian export.  
With these theoretical benefits in mind, the next section starts with looking at the state of the 
Zambian TC industry, before exploring how the Zambian government promote industrial 
development, while the last part identifies factors impacting growth of the Zambian TC sector. 
3. The Zambian TC industry: state of, institutions and challenges 
3.1. Growth trends for the Zambian TC industry 
3.1.1. Cotton, textiles and garments 
The Zambian cotton sector was organised around the state-owned Lint Company of Zambia 
(LINCO) from 1977 to privatisation of the sector in 1994 (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010:5). 
Zambia’s shift towards a marked-led economy, has led to an unquestioned success of the cotton 
sector. After a first phase of rather integrated privatisation, the government has engaged more in 
the cotton sector from 2005, with mixed results (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). Since 2005, a 
significant number new players at the ginning level of the cotton industry has entered, in 
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addition to a recurrence of the credit default crisis13 of the late 1990s (Tschirley and Kabwe, 
2009:3). Since 2007, cotton production has grown and is suspected to be on its second recovery 
(Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010:6). Based on information from the Zambian Development Agency 
(ZDA) (2008:11) these are the ginning companies in Zambia: 
 Alliance Cotton, 2 locations (multinational). 
 Birchand Cotton Limited, 1 location (Tanzania, multinational). 
 Cargill Cotton Company, 3 locations (USA, multinational).  
 Chipata-China Cotton Company, 2 locations (China).  
 Continental Cotton, 1 location, (local). 
 Dunavant Cotton Limited, 6 locations (USA, multinational).  
 Great Lakes Cotton Company14, (South Africa, multinational). 
 Lungwa Ginnery Limited, 1 location, (local). 
 Mulungushi Cotton and Cooking Oil Company, 1 location, (Zambia/China).  
 Yustine Cotton and Cooking Oil Co, (Malawi).  
As seen, the composition of ownership in ginning involves mainly foreign actors. The entrance of 
so many new and aggressive buyers in the Zambian cotton industry has had implications for 
governance of the sector, as many of the ginning companies operate on different forms of out-
grower schemes to support cotton farmers and to access the cotton output (Tschirley et al, 
2008). The two largest ginning companies and ultimately cotton growers are the American 
multinational affiliates, Dunavant Cotton Limited and Cargill Cotton15. These provide input, pre-
finance support to small-scale farmers through out-grower schemes for farmers to produce high 
quality cotton seed (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). This provides gins with a fixed price for cotton, 
although the Cotton Task Force (2006:16) notes that the fixed price is normally very low and 
discourages farmers to increase production.  
An interviewee from the private cotton industry in Zambia informed that Dunavant holds 66 per 
cent of the market share of cotton in Zambia (Interview 9). A government official questioned the 
big role Dunavant has in the cotton sector, and what impact it has on access of cotton lint for 
local textile manufacturing (Interview 6). Since 2000, independent cotton traders16 have largely 
disappeared, while Dunavant and Cargill are part of some of the largest private owned 
businesses in the world (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010:15). Dunavant sells cotton lint to or through 
Europe, whereas Cargill is and has for the past thirty years been on the forefront with cotton 
trade to and from China (Cargill Cotton webpage, 2011; Dunavant Entreprises webpage, 2011). 
Both companies have launched programmes to mainstream cotton production through public 
private partnerships in Africa, through developing the brand “Cotton made in Africa (CmiA)” 
(Tschirley and Kabwe, 2009:23; Schneider, 2010; Peltzer, 2011). Key aspects include 
improvement in cotton production techniques, food security, health care and schools, 
environmental sustainability and gender issues (ibid). 
Zambia is now among the top ten producers for cotton in SSA (USITC, 2009:1-4). Cotton made in 
Zambia has due to out-grower schemes become among the best in the region (higher quality and 
price compared to cotton from South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania) and international 
competitive (Bennet et al, 2011:13; Interview 9; Estur, 2008). Based on information from the 
Zambian government, they are currently developing cotton clusters; to promote local processing 
and consumption of cotton related businesses (Interview 4; Interview 6; ZDA, 2008). Also, 
COMESA encourages investments through public private partnerships in these cotton clusters 
(COMESA, 2011). On one hand, cotton production has improved both in terms of production, 
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quality and price, due to liberalisation of the sector. On the other hand, the ownership of the 
sector is largely on foreign hands, which might impact the ability for cotton to create a spin of for 
the national economy.   
Moving further up the value chain, weaving and knitting sectors are dependent on spinning mills 
transforming cotton lint to yarn to supply the TC industry. In 1970, Zambia had about 85 textile 
mills; increasing to more than 140 by 1991 (Slotterbackset, 2007:11). The 1990s witnessed 
some major investments into the weaving, knitting and garment sub-sectors, such as in the 
Mulungushi Textiles in Kabwe, which benefitted from a joint partnership between the Zambian 
and the Chinese government (Koyi, 2006 262).  ince then, Zambia’s once thriving TC industry 
has contracted in terms of production and number of enterprises. Shortly after the election of 
President Chiluba in 1991, Zambia was opened for foreign trade and tariffs were repealed. 
Second-hand clothes were valued at USD 0, which allowed massive import to the price of 
transportation (Slotterbackset, 2007:11). This proved to be catastrophic for the national TC 
industry, which could not compete. Due to imports of second-hand clothes, 30,000 out of 34,000 
textile jobs were lost (ibid). Furthermore, more competition was brought on by global trade 
liberalisation of TC in 2005, especially from low-cost producers as China. As a consequence, 
many local industries downsized and laid off workers, others closed down production or 
relocated to neighbouring countries17, where production costs were perceived to be lower 
(Seshami and Simeo, 2006:3).  
Two Zambian government officials explained that the industry manufacture finished textiles and 
garments at a very low scale, as there is less than five textile manufacturing enterprises left 
(Interview 4; Interview 6). Only four textile manufacturers have confirmed their existence in 
Zambia in 201118. For clothing producers, two companies are located in Lusaka, although, most 
likely there are others both in Lusaka, Ndola and Livingstone. Literature explains the number of 
companies in the Zambian textile industry has contracted from about 140 companies in 1991, to 
less than fifty in 2002 (Slotterbackset, 2007:11; Chikoti and Mutonga, 2002:2). In December 
2004, only ten of these companies had the capacity to compete regionally and internationally, 
while in 2007 the number went down to eight manufacturers (Koyi, 2006:263; Lee, 2007). In 
addition, the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles (ZCMT) closed down production in 2007, as 
well as some of the integrated industries, followed by the Swarp Spinning Mills in 2008 and in 
January 2011 the closure of Kafue Textiles was announced due to financial difficulties19 (Brooks, 
2010; United States International Trade Commission, USITC, 2009:4-75; Post of Zambia, 28 
January 2011). From employing between 15,000 to 25,000 in the TC industry in the 1980s20; by 
2002 the employment numbers was below 2,500 (Cotton Task Force, 2006:19; Chikoti and 
Mutonga 2002:1).  
As seen during fieldwork, the textile industry in Zambia is in dire straits. The impact of imported 
TC products has resulted in a decline of the national TC industry and employment opportunities 
in the formal sector, leading to an informalisation of the Zambian workforce.  
Representatives for the TC industry in Zambia (Interview 5; 7; 13; 14) and an academic 
interviewee (Interview 2) explain how the remaining clothing manufacturers in Zambia have 
focused on niche products as a strategy to stay in business. The Lusaka Clothing Factory and City 
Clothing Factory are big and established clothing manufacturers based in Lusaka; producing 
items such as shirts, school uniforms and protective wear. A worker at the City Clothing Factory 
explained that the business had been dependent on contracts with the Zambian government, to 
produce uniforms for police and army to remain in production (Interview 7). Similarly, the 
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Lusaka Clothing Factory has benefitted from being under the City Council of Lusaka and 
receiving contacts to produce for the Zambian government. As the clothing market was 
liberalised in 2005, the City Clothing Factory no longer use any meaningful amount of 
domestically produced textiles as input to their garment manufacturing, as Asian textiles are 
produced more cost-effective. Despite buying Asian textiles from a wholesaler or retailer, these 
textiles tend to come out cheaper than Zambian textiles bought directly from the producer 
(ibid). Ultimately, choosing imported textiles over domestically produces textiles, results in 
limited benefit for domestic textile producers. 
One of the few remaining textile manufacturers is the Mukuba Textiles in Ndola. According to a 
representative at the factory, Mukuba Textiles operates with five per cent production and is 
struggling due to shortage of working capital (Interview 13). The factory mainly produces 
mutton cloth from cotton yarn, for the mining sector as the market for cleaning materials has 
been steadily increasing. Earlier, the factory used Zambian cotton, employed 400 people to 
produce 100 per cent cotton yarn from which knitting and weaving mills produced fabrics for 
such as shirts, cotton drills and towels. Over the last ten years, the market has been taken over 
by imports from China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, and currently almost all the cotton yarn 
from Zambia is exported to South Africa (ibid). Seen during fieldwork, Excel Textiles Limited in 
Ndola is still operational under Indian owners. Towel Textiles in Kitwe is currently employing 
38 people, but has halted production awaiting new yarn supplies according to a representative 
at the factory (Interview 14). Carmody and Hampwaye (2010:88) argue Sakiza Spinning has 
seen investments from Asian companies. Ohno (2007) explains that Sakiza Spinning is run by a 
Kenyan-Indian owned company, who are investing in new equipment for further expansion. No 
data supports evidence of Kays Textiles Limited being active in 2011; according to the textile 
news site Fibre2Fashion (22 September, 2006) the company last filled a vacancy for a manager 
in textile industry in 2006.  
3.1.2. Market access 
Responses from academic interviewees (Interview 1; 2) and government officials in Lusaka 
(Interview 4; 6) concerning markets available for Zambian TC products can be summarised in 
the following: it is well and good to talk about big market(s), but the market is of no use without 
anything to sell. Export of cotton dominates over TC exports, and increased import of TC has an 
additional impact,  perpetuating the lack of competitive producers nationally. As a consequence, 
Zambian TC producers do not have much to offer under preferential trade agreements. Already 
before the MFA ended in 2005 (2000-2004 period), export of textiles dropped while primary 
agricultural exports increased, despite the industry being stimulated by increased cotton 
production, direct exports under AGOA and increased investments in cotton processing (FNDP, 
2006:124,115). This again shows that the Zambian TC industry was in trouble already before 
liberalisation of the industry in 2005.     
Regarding cotton exports, a Zambian government representative explains that over 90 per cent 
of cotton produced in Zambia is exported (Interview 4). A study by the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) (2009:4-75,4-76) shows that in 2007, Zambia’s export 
of TC inputs totalled USD 14.5 million, were cotton yarn accounted for 98 per cent the TC export. 
As seen in table 2, Zambia does not export to USA, but EU has been the leading destination for 
Zambian TC inputs. In 200 , as much as 93 per cent of Zambia’s yarn export ended up in EU. 
Countries in SSA accounted for about five per cent of the export of Zambian TC inputs in 2007, 
down from 41 per cent in 2003 (ibid). Muneku (2009:166) argues Chinese imports from Zambia 
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are mainly in the commodities copper and cotton. Cotton export to China has however not 
appeared in official statistics from the Central Statistical Office Zambia (CSOZ) in 2011, although 
this could be a sign of unofficial export channels (CSOZ, 2011). 
Table 2: Exports of Zambian textile and apparel inputs (USD 1,000) 
Destination 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
SSA countries 10,658 8,605 5,217 1,898 779 
EU-27 15,277 22,562 21,792 18,269 13,476 
Rest of world 10 237 8,496 72 278 
United States 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 25,947 31,404 35,505 20,239 14,532 
Source: World Bank, WITS Database (December 3, 2008) cited in USITC (2009:4-76). 
Looking at import of TC inputs, which totalled USD 12.3 million in 2007, more than a half 
consisted of woven fabric, where major suppliers were India (USD 3.9 million) and China (USD 
3.2 million) (USITC, 2009:4- 6). Zambia’s TC import increased by 25 per cent during the period 
from 2003 to 2007, whereas import of woven fabrics declined, while import of knit fabrics, man-
made fibre21 and other fabrics and trims increased. The result was that apart from domestically 
produced cotton yarn, small amounts of cotton/polyester and acrylic yarns, all other inputs used 
by Zambia’s clothing industry were imported (ibid). Worn clothing and other worn articles 
appear on the list from CSOZ, accounting for 2.1 per cent of total imports from the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) with a value of Kwacha 2.4 million22 (ibid). 
Markets available for TC products in SADC and COMESA countries have significantly diminished 
after the end of the MFA in 2005 (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008; Brautigam, 2009). Besides cotton 
yarn export, the leading markets for Zambia’s export of niche products were the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and South Africa (USITC, 2009:4-77). 
Numbers from the CSOZ (2011:14,15) in March 201123 confirms that TC products, contributes 
very little to the overall export from Zambia.  
There are opportunities to improve local consumption of cotton through integrated TC 
industries. Due to the competitive pressure under a liberalised TC market, Zambia’s demand for 
TC products is met by imports. The textile industry is in trouble, where clothing procurers opt 
for using imported TC inputs due to availability and price. A survival strategy for TC producers 
has been to produce niche products for Zambia and neighbouring countries. Ultimately, the 
country loses benefit in terms of value addition, employment and market creation.  
3.2. Zambian responsibility for development: national plans and institutions 
From 2004, the Zambian government committed to facilitate development through the private 
sector (Kragelund, 2009b:488). As the Zambian economy is capital scarce, the government 
attached importance to making Zambia an attractive destination for FDI. During the past years 
economic growth and prospect for economic development have improved in Zambia. The next 
task is to channel FDI to enhance economic development and diversify the economy to reduce 
the impact of external price shocks on the national economy. National plans and industrial 
policies, especially over the longer term, are essential for LDC to develop in the liberal 
environment. As seen, industrialisation through the TC sector could be one option to diversify 
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the economic base and create employment through the links it may create across different 
economic sectors in the economy.  
3.2.1. The Fifth National Development Plan (2006-2010) 
The Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) named: “Broad based wealth and job creation 
through citizenry participation and technological advancement” is a principal national document 
outlining strategies and programmes to be implemented from 2006 to 201024 (FNDP, 2006). 
Policies to build the manufacturing sector under the FNDP were oriented towards promoting 
higher levels of domestic and foreign investment, to stimulate economic growth and poverty 
alleviation mainly through employment creation. The plan acknowledges that TC manufacturing 
offer key opportunities to expand trade; is an important tool for economic growth; and a 
prerequisite for long-term poverty reduction (FNDP, 2006:123,125). Although, the FNDP 
(2006:115,116) recognises micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) potential to create 
employment and wealth, it has proposed a more general approach to tackle some of the 
constraints faced by the manufacturing sector, these are: 
a) Assisting with finance to the private sector.  
b) Removal of administrative barriers to establish business enterprises.  
c) Improve infrastructure and ensuring access to affordable modern technology. 
d) Improve regulatory frameworks.  
e) Build MFEZs to enhance export and locally oriented manufacturing industries.  
With this approach, the FNDP does not show strategies or goals to build the sub-sectors of the 
manufacturing sector, as it handles the industry at a general level. 
 The manufacturing sector is meant to contribute 15 per cent to the GDP in 2011. Despite this 
vision, only an average of 10.2 per cent was achieved (Sixth National Development Plan, SNDP, 
2011:133). The growth rate for the manufacturing sector declined from 5.8 per cent to 2.5 per 
cent from 2006 to 2009 (SNDP, 2011:134). The sub-sector showing most negative growth are 
textile and leather products in terms of contribution to the GDP between 2005 and 2009 (ibid). 
The textile sub-sector experienced a significant drop throughout the FNDP period, due to 
reduced domestic demand in favour of imported TC products, the high cost of doing business 
and the impact of the recent global financial crisis (SNDP, 2011:134,135). As a consequence, 
textile exports dropped significantly to regional and international markets due to the inability to 
compete (ibid). 
During the FNDP the business environment for foreign and domestic investors became more 
conducive as institutional and legislative reforms were undertaken (SNDP, 2011:133). An 
academic interviewee highlighted that the FNDP provides good discussion of how to diversify 
the economy and create employment, but the strategies itself and tools of implementation where 
not there (Interview 1). Another academic interviewee explained that the FNDP has employment 
as theme, but the plan’s weakness was that employment was not set as an objective in the 
macroeconomic framework (Interview 2). Furthermore, the FNDP was not anchored on a well 
thought-out strategic approach that filtered down to implementation of the specific sub-sectors. 
According to the interviewee, the sectors in the FNDP stand alone, without any coordinating 
mechanisms or institution with a clear mandate to drive employment creation. The FNDP is 
developed by the Ministry of National Planning; a ministry that does not have a division or 
department for labour creation. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security for its matter, is 
mandated for the administrative aspects of labour, but not labour creation (ibid). Evidently, the 
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FNDP does not have clear targets to how much employment it intends to create or from which 
sectors employment creation will come from. Although, the FNDP as such marked a return of 
development planning, it became a wish list donors could choose and pick from instead of 
national priorities for the Zambian economy (Kragelund, 2012:10; Mwanawina, 2008:22; Fraser, 
2007). The FNDP was underfinanced and ended up as a political document side-tracked by the 
donors due to lack of own resources (Kragelund, 2012:10).  
3.2.2. The Sixth National Development Plan (2011-2015) 
In February 2011, the Zambian government started implementing the Sixth National 
Development Plan ( NDP), named “ ustained economic growth and poverty reduction”, as the 
FNDP period just ended. According to the Zambian Institute for Policy Analysis and Research 
(ZIPAR, 2011) it is noteworthy that while the FNDP recognizes all sector of the Zambian 
economy, the SNDP focuses on only six sector programmes or areas of focus, which are critical to 
achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. By comparison to the FNDP, the SNDP can 
thus be seen as more influenced by the Zambian government, and more detailed in terms of 
planning and monitoring (Kragelund, 2012:9,10; SNDP, 2011). The SNDP resources are 
concentrated around infrastructure (50 per cent), human development (33.9 per cent) and 
growth sectors (11.9 per cent) (SNDP, 2011). The manufacturing sector is located under growth 
sectors; other sectors of the SNDP include crosscutting issues, support sectors and regional 
development (ibid). 
The SNDP continues to pursue liberal trade policy at regional and international levels, aimed at 
enhancing domestic, regional and multilateral trade, expand the scope and coverage of 
multilateral, regional and bilateral arrangements such as free trade agreements (FTAs)25 and 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs)26 to ensure better access to markets, trade and 
investment opportunities (SNDP, 2006:140). The SNDP focus on attracting quality to the 
manufacturing sector by providing good regulatory frameworks and a business environment 
that aims to link FDI to the needs of the domestic economy.  The plan can thus be seen to 
explicitly target products with high export potential, such as TC in addition to agricultural 
products as cotton27 (SNDP, 2011:142). The plan recognises the manufacturing sector as 
essential for economic development through its backward and forward links in the economy, 
export potential and employment creation (SNDP, 2011). Strategies to increase export and 
employment are through the five following programmes (SNDP, 2011:136):  
a) Develop Multi Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ)/ industrial parks.      
b) Joint ventures and public-private partnerships.  
c) Private sector development.  
d) Promote micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).  
e) Develop rural based industrial enterprises.  
Output matrix and key performance indicators are used to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of the sector programmes under the SNDP. Targets for the manufacturing sector 
are to double the share of total export from two to four per cent from 2009 to 2015, while 
increasing the share of total employment in the sector from 3.22 per cent to four per cent in the 
same period (SNDP, 2011:138). Compared to the FNDP, the strategies and targets under the 
SNDP are also developed to support the manufacturing sector at a general level, without clear 
targets and strategies to build the sub-sectors of manufacturing, create employment in the TC 
industry or handle some of the contextual factors impacting growth of the TC sector. However, 
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positive developments include focus on improving infrastructure and the business environment; 
where legislative and institutional developments have taken place. Among these, the MFEZs 
initiative is important in terms of providing a foundation for investors wanting to establish light 
industrial production in the country.  
3.2.3. The Zambia Development Agency – making short-cuts for development? 
The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) emerged in 2006, as an amalgation of five institutions. 
Its creation was deemed important in order to reduce bureaucratic procedures (FNDP, 2006:37; 
Mwanawina, 2008:5). The institution was established to promote economic growth by 
encouraging FDI, promoting export, facilitating and supporting SMEs, and is perceived as a one-
stop-shop for foreign investors (Chisala, 2008; Kragelund, 2009a:647). Additionally, the 
Zambian government passed the MFEZ regulations in late 2006, which allows the establishment 
of MFEZs throughout Zambia (Kragelund, 2009b:492).  
ZDA is in the process of implementing MFEZs, which generally are targeted at large and high-
tech companies and will have the necessary infrastructure for easy commencement of business 
activities (Chisala, 2008:13). According to a government interviewee, the MFEZ programme is to 
catalyse industrial and economic development through increased activity in the manufacturing 
sector; a model provided by the Asian miracle economies, and thus seen as new economic 
strategies for development in Zambia (Interview 6). As the majority of natural resources and 
agricultural materials are exported in raw form from Zambia, a process of value addition is 
essential to enhance both domestic and export-oriented businesses (Ministry of Commerce, 
Trade and Industry, MCTI, 2011:19). In this way, the MFEZ initiative in Zambia is considered an 
important initiative to build the manufacturing sector and to create much needed employment. 
Out of six locations28 earmarked for MFEZs and industrial parks29, two are Chinese pilot zones, 
developed by a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) (MCTI, 2011). Officially the Chinese pilot 
zones are called Zambia-China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), however Zambians use the name 
Chambishi MFEZ, with the sub-zone Lusaka East MFEZ (Xinhua, November 6, 2009). MFEZ 
regulations were developed independently from Chinese investors, who were among the first to 
take advantage of the incentives provided (Brautigam and Tang, 2010:30). Investors are open to 
suggest areas to develop and land identification for MFEZs, but the ZDA has developed a list over 
national priority sectors, to provide incentives and link investors to the needs of the Zambian 
economy (MCTI, 2011). Legally, local and foreign investors have equal opportunities to invest in 
any MFEZ or industrial park, but the MFEZ regulations requires investments on not less than 
USD 500,000 for investor to benefit from the incentives. The textile sector is ranked as the fifth 
national priority sector, and therefore investors choosing to establish textile production in 
MFEZs will benefit from the ZDA incentives (MCTI, 2011:13). According to the Investors 
handbook 2011, these incentives include (MCTI, 2011:12):  
 Zero per cent tax for five years from the first day a company makes profit. 
 The first six to eight years only 50 per cent of profits will be taxed, while year nine and ten, 
75 per  cent of profits will be taxed.  
 A zero per cent tax rate will be given on dividends of companies operating under the  
MFEZ priority sector for a period of five years from the year of first declaration of 
dividends.  
 A zero per cent import duty on raw materials, capital goods, machinery for five years and 
the Deferment of Value Added Tax (VAT) on machinery and equipment imported for 
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investment in MFEZ and/ or priority sector. 
In order to obtain a licence to invest in a MFEZ, investors have to demonstrate according to the 
Qualification Criteria of ZDA [2006 Act] how the Zambian economy will benefit30 (MCTI, 2011:9). 
The following list provides a summary over the key criteria’s needed for a company to obtain a 
licence for MFEZ production (MCTI, 2011:11):  
 Contribution to local employment creation, the amount and quality of local employment.  
 The extent of skills development and transfer to local entrepreneurs and communities. 
 Outline introduction and transfer of technology.  
 Show the level of investment and how the business plans to attract further domestic 
investments and FDI, make use of local raw materials and intermediate goods, and if the 
project will lead to expansion of local production.  
 To what extent will the investments impact the environment, diversification of the 
economy, and lead to increased foreign exchange earnings?  
 Is the business is export-oriented and to what extent does the project lead to import 
substitution or make use of preferential trade agreements? 
 To what extent does the business leads to social development? 
As seen from the list above, the investor needs to demonstrate impact on employment, skills and 
technology, state revenue and market creation. This can thus be seen as a positive development 
of ZDA legislation, as investors are required to signal how investments will benefit the Zambian 
economy. The ZDA Act of 1996 compared, had no requirements regarding local content, 
technology transfer, equity, employment or use of subcontracting by foreign investors; but 
urged foreign investors to make a commitment to local participation, while allowing investors to 
repatriate any capital investment freely and to send home profits, dividends, interests, fees and 
royalties as well as permitting foreign nationals to send wages earned in Zambia abroad 
(Kragelund, 2009b:492). This detail, however, has a downside: if the qualification criteria's set 
by the ZDA becomes too comprehensive or difficult to answer, it might be easier for foreign 
investors to go to countries with simpler procedures for establishing a company. It would be 
interesting to see how companies answer the qualification criteria application, how these 
applications are judged by the ZDA and ultimately see how easy (or hard) is it to get a licence for 
MFEZ production. It is expected that this information should be found in the Master Plan 
specifically developed for each individual MFEZ31. 
As the ZDA stipulates a minimum investment target for setting up production in an MFEZ, this 
may discourage Zambian entrepreneurs to take part and to benefit from incentives for value 
addition in MFEZs. Information from the Zambian Business Forum (ZBF) for the MSMEs in 
Zambia, highlights that finance is a start-up issue for these companies, which also was confirmed 
by literature (Interview 12; Chisala, 2008; Clarke et al, 2010; Conway and Shah, 2010). 
Consequently, concerns were raised that some Chinese companies do not consider entering into 
joint venture projects with locals (Muneku, 2009). In line with this observation, Kragelund 
(2009b:492) argues that industrial policies in Zambia lack the focus on forming links between 
local and foreign companies.  
National plans in Zambia have created a better business environment, focused on infrastructure 
development and put down a foundation that will ease economic development in the future. 
However, they could be more specific in terms of planning and strategies to build specific sub-
sectors of the economy such as the TC industry. Specifically important for export earnings and 
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ultimately labour creation are links between sectors of the economy. The national plans do not 
show targets to where or how much employment the Zambian government intends to create in 
the different sub-sectors of manufacturing. The ZDA was established to reduce bureaucratic 
procedures, facilitate a better business environment and promote economic development. ZDA 
is responsible for MFEZ regulation and providing incentives for investors. One positive aspect of 
the MFEZ initiative is that it attracts large foreign investments for business activity in 
manufacturing for the longer term. These investments may lead to employment creation, skill 
and technology transfer and expanded opportunities for trade. On the other side, challenges are 
linked to the accessibility for locals to benefit in terms of investing in, enjoying incentives for 
business creation and employment creation for local workers. Yet, there has been some change 
to the MFEZ legislation with regard to the national benefit. Overall, MFEZ developments still are 
at an early stage, where it is too early to fully grasp the impact. 
3.3. Contextual factors impacting growth of sector 
3.3.1. Where the Chinese are helping 
Chinese actors in infrastructure and construction sectors are instrumental in supporting 
economic development in Zambia, and solving some of the contextual factors hindering growth 
within the TC sector. Chinese actors reduce costs and improve trade links through supporting 
infrastructure developments as railway, roads and bridges; helps the shortage of power by 
constructing and providing loans to build power plants; and facilitating a better business 
environment by making telecommunication more accessible. Chinese actors in construction and 
infrastructure sectors have become especially important after the recent economic crisis and 
withdrawal of donor support (Davies, 2010:23; Kragelund, 2012). The high cost of 
infrastructure, namely rail and road transport and electricity, impact on the productivity and 
growth of the TC sector. As Zambia is landlocked, access to ports also adds to delivery times and 
freight costs (USITC, 2009:4-79; Page, 2010). Although, infrastructure projects often are linked 
to extractive industries and tied to China’s resource scarcity, they are indeed expanding and 
facilitating transportation access and regional integration within and between African 
economies (Davies, 2010:21). Economic zones in Zambia also drive the demand for rail, road, 
electricity, and has helped to spur the demand for more modern airport facilities (Kabange, 
2010). Chinese policy banks provide concessional financing as the lending hand for the 
government; state-owned and state-align companies usually focus on infrastructure and 
construction projects, while private Chinese companies are involved as contractors (Davies, 
2010:12,21).  
As some illustrations for the role of China in Zambia: The TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia Railway) 
was built and financed with an interest-free loan by the Chinese government between 1970 and 
1975, to eliminate economic dependence and to provide an alternative trade route (Brautigam, 
2009; Koyi and Kamwanga, 2009:22). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese 
government continued to provide interest-free loans for spare parts and rehabilitation, in 
addition rescheduling payment of debt when necessary (Brautigam, 2009:84, 128). A 
government representative informed the railway is now planned for an overhaul, and to be 
linked to Angola to help Zambia’s industrialisation process (Interview 6; Lusaka Times, 1 
December 2011). This has, however, been on the planning table for the Zambian government 
since independence (Interview 2).  
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With regard to improving roads in Zambia, the Lusaka-Kaoma Road was financed by a interest 
free loan from China in 1967 and the Serenje-Mansa Road in 1974; both symbols of Chinese 
development projects after independence (Kragelund, 2009a:648; Mwanawina, 2008:12). More 
recently, a part of the Lusaka–Chirundu Road was rehabilitated by a Chinese contractor in 2009 
(Lusaka Times, 20 March 2009). The Lusaka–Chirundu Road is part of the North South Corridor 
project32 linking Zambia to the Southern neighbours, developed in four sections, where three of 
the road links have been financed by the Chinese government and the World Bank (TradeMark 
Southern Africa, 2012). In 2006, China also expressed interest to assist Zambia in constructing 
the Chembe Bridge across the Luapula River, on the border between Zambia and DRC (Carmody, 
2009:1199; 2010:90; Mwanawina, 2008:12). Obstacles such as unreliable electricity supply in 
Zambia also impact the growth of the TC sector (USITC, 2009). Chinese actors have initiated 
several projects to improve power supply in Zambia. China Development Bank (CDB) and the 
Zambian government signed in August 2010 a USD 1.5 billion deal to develop Kafue Gorge Lower 
power station, through the Beijing-based Sinohydro Corporation, to alleviate bottlenecks Zambia 
is facing in terms of hydropower (Lusaka Times, 11 May 2010; Lusaka Times, 13 August 2010). 
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) provided a USD 285 million loan for a 
365km stretch of hydroelectric power line linking Southern and Eastern Africa (Reuters Africa, 
30 May 2011). Construction is expected to start in June 2012, building two high voltage electric 
power transmission lines, which is expected to feed into new mining and agricultural projects, 
including cotton (Reuters Africa, 13 March 2012). Construction of power stations are also linked 
to improving power supply for the mining industry, such as the building of Lumwana Power 
Project to supply the Lumwana Copper Mine (Baah and Jauch, 2009b:13).  
Telecommunication is also an important part in improving the cost of doing business and 
improving infrastructure. Carmody (2010) argues China as the leading exporter of less 
expensive high tech products as mobile phones, open opportunities for services and business. In 
Zambia, the Chinese company Huawei Technologies in addition to supplying cheap cell phones, 
is a equipment supplier in the process to build national fibre-optic infrastructure for Zamtel 
(Zambia Telecommunications Company) (Balancing Act, 5 March 2008). Both Chinese and 
Indian investors are investing in the Zambian telecommunication sector, where operators are 
deploying more GSM cellular sites and 3G base stations to serve the growing demand for mobile 
telephony (Transformanz, 21 March 2012). 
3.3.2. Policy needs – balancing consumption and production needs  
As discussed, second-hand clothes from Western countries33 and low-cost TC goods from Asian 
countries34 are creating a difficult environment for the Zambian TC industry to compete. 
Especially, low priced clothing takes over a large share of the domestic market for locally 
produced TC products. This was highlighted by most interviewees in government (Interview 4; 
6), in academia (Interview 1; 2; 3) and in the industry (Interview 7; 13) in Zambia, and can be 
found in the literature (Koyi, 2006:260; Brautigam, 2009:219; USITC, 2009:4-77). Based on 
information from informal markets around Lusaka, Zambian traders fly to China to buy TC 
products, in addition takes models of fashion clothes to China to produce cheap and affordable 
replica (Interview 5; Interview 1). Academic interviewees explain that Zambians are becoming 
fashion conscious and although the purchasing power is low, cheap Asian TC goods are 
especially suited for this market (Interview 3; 1). On one side, influx of cheap TC products is 
positive as it provides Zambian consumers with choices and provides alternative for 
employment for traders, even if in the informal sector (Muneku, 2009:167). The flip side of this 
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argument is that increased informal employment activity as trading, creates a counter effect for 
the national economy, as it makes it specifically difficult to build a TC industry (Interview 1). As 
seen in Lusaka, there is an increase of street vending involving youth selling Chinese 
merchandise, which provides little added value to Zambia’s economy (Muneku, 2009:167). 
While the majority of Zambian MSMEs are in agriculture (70 per cent), followed by 
retail/wholesale (21 per cent), both sectors having predominantly informal employment; import 
of low-cost TC products expands the informal sector (Conway and Shah, 2010:4,5). 
Central factors in explaining the difficult situation for the Zambian TC industry are out-dated and 
obsolete technology. Old equipment restrains productivity, quality, costs and competiveness 
(USITC, 2009:4-70; Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support Programme, RATES, 
2003:25). Most machinery (95 per cent) of existing weaving companies is more than 15 to 20 
years old, and some had already been second-hand when originally installed (RATES, 2003:28). 
Many companies in the TC sector experience competitiveness problems due to low utilisation 
rates, high consumption of spare parts, inadequate cash flows, debt and the inability to add value 
(Cotton Task Force, 2006; RATES, 2003; USITC, 2009). Lack of modern technology used in 
weaving, restricts the manufacturers choice of garment to be made, due to poor quality of 
fabrics. Hence, the bulk of garments produced in Zambia today are uniforms, protective wear 
and school wear that largely are consumed domestically, as these products struggle to compete 
according to price and quality in the export market (ibid).  
Lack of skilled labour, training facilities together with low worker productivity impacts 
competiveness. Workers trained as electricians or engineers tend to relocate to the mining 
sector when copper prices are high, offering higher wages (USITC, 2009:4-78). There is no 
textile training available nationally, and companies need to conduct training at own expense 
(ibid). However, Indian investors were said to be planning textile training in the Copperbelt 
(Interview 3). Not unrelated, Zambia is ranked as having the lowest worker productivity in 
manufacturing, as measured by value added per worker in Sub-Saharan Africa (USITC, 2009:3-
11). Value added per worker in a medium-sized manufacturing firm in Zambia was USD 1,773, 
while India had USD 15,238 and China USD 14,198 compared (ibid).   
Although, trade unions are important institutions to push for improved rights for workers in a 
local economy, the trade unions in the TC sector has been slow to react in Zambia (Koyi, 
2006:272). When Mulungishi Textiles closed in 2007, the National Union for Commercial and 
Industrial Workers (NUCIW) lost one fifth of its membership (Baah and Jauch, 2009b:22). 
Sibanda (undated) argue the collapse of the textile industry also led to the death of the body 
representing the interest of the sector, the Textile Producers of Zambia (TPZ); the body 
representing the TC industry is currently placed under the Association of Manufacturers (ZAM). 
In contrast to cotton production in USA, European countries35 and China36; cotton in Zambia is 
produced without help of government subsidies. China, India and Argentina criticised USA for 
not doing enough to reduce cotton subsidies, as it provides an unfair market advantage over 
cotton farmers from poorer nations (Cotton 24/7, 2 July 2010). Although, the subsidies were 
aimed to protect American farmers from subsidised Chinese cotton imports, the impact is felt for 
African cotton producers (Brautigam, 2009). Zambia is not in a situation for the government to 
subsidise cotton to improve crop efficiency or price. For Zambian TC manufacturers, the result is 
that the price of the end product will resemble the price of the raw material. Consequently, for 
Zambia to compete with countries who subsidises cotton, labour costs will have to be 
significantly reduced as a strategy to cut costs. Several Africa governments are currently facing 
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the dilemma between creating employment through relaxing labour laws to absorb labour, or 
creating few but formal and decent jobs. Some developing countries [Argentina, Egypt, Vietnam] 
exporting agricultural products, have become increasingly protectionist after the agricultural 
commodity price started to increase in 2007, through either restricting their export or 
introducing export taxes (Van Dijk, 2009b:167). This also raises the question: can the Zambian 
government introduce policies to protect the infant TC industry, with its backward links into 
cotton farming37? 
3.3.3. Protectionism is not an option 
In Zambia, policies of protectionism are currently very unlikely due to at least four factors: WTO 
membership, the need to attract FDI, the historical context of nationalism, and cost implications 
for local consumers.  
Firstly, in 1995 Zambia became member of the WTO, which narrowed policy choices for Zambia 
to pursue protectionist trade, industrial and investment policies (Kragelund, 2009b:489). The 
WTO covers many aspects of FDI, and although LDCs are allowed to deviate from general rules at 
times, the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement bans certain performance 
requirements related to local content, mandatory technology transfer and export requirements 
(ibid). In this way, TRIMs are rules that restrict preference of domestic firms and thereby enable 
international firms to operate more easily within a foreign market. Although, this can be seen as 
positive with regards to attracting FDI; it restricts the Zambian government’s ability to protect 
the national TC industry. Also the expiration of the MFA under the WTO in 2005, meant 
liberalisation of the global TC industry (van Dijk, 2009b:167; Brautigam, 2009:216). As a result, 
Zambia’s manufacturing industry was exposed to compete on “equal” terms with the rest of the 
world. Not being able to protect domestic enterprises from more cost effective producers, has 
had a negative impact on the Zambian TC industry. 
Secondly, a government representative argues that protectionist policies are unlikely, as the 
Zambian government has committed to a very liberal economy to attract FDI and to create a 
good environment for private sector development (Interview 6). Protectionist policies could act 
as a disincentive for attracting investments and technology in the TC sector. As seen in the 
2000s, more companies, and especially Chinese investors, seem to be filling the gaps in the 
Zambian economy (ibid). Zambia is also dependent on foreign support, as historically the 
country has had a donor dependent budget with domestic scarcity of capital (Fraser, 2007). 
Third, an academic interviewee highlights that protectionism is unlikely due to the historical 
context of nationalism under President Kaunda, which was marked with a race to the bottom in 
Zambia (Interview 1). Although, nationalism does not necessarily involve protectionism, Kaunda 
used protectionist policies restricting import and favoured production only for the domestic 
market. With few links to regional and international markets, limited product ranges and with 
few possibilities to upgrade, it ended up in food riots in the beginning of the 1990s (ibid). 
Coming from a history where the Zambian government was in every sector of the economy; the 
government moved away from parastatal companies when they were failing to deliver in the 
early 1990s (Interview 1).  
The fourth factor explaining the unlikeness of protectionism relate to domestic politics. An 
academic interviewee notes that if the Zambian government is to create policies to protect the 
national TC industry, they would have to be prepared to face the backlash from the Zambian 
people (interview 1). By raising import taxes/tariffs, the Zambian government could restrict the 
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amount of second-hand clothes and Asian imports into Zambia, as imports would become more 
expensive, to the favour of local products. The backlash may come from two levels. First, the 
majority of the Zambian population is working in the informal sector, with a limited income. 
Raising taxes could result in more expensive clothes, which again would reduce the purchasing 
power of Zambians. Secondly, people in the formal sector are not necessary able to buy clothes 
from modern shopping malls, and is negatively affected as their expenses would increase, 
reducing their purchasing power. Although, the quality is lower for cheap imports and second-
hand clothes, people buy what they can afford. Raising tariffs in a protectionist move could 
further push people into the informal sector of the Zambian economy and would make the 
Zambian government very unpopular (ibid). 
3.3.4. Troubled trade agreements 
As the output of the Zambian TC industry is very low, and producers struggle to meet the 
standard required for international trade; the Zambian economy does not fully benefit from 
preferential market access. However, issues are also identified on the granting side of these 
agreements, which will be explored accordingly. 
Brautigam (2009:96) argues AGOA has been disappointing for African countries, as rules of 
origin have been constantly changing and due to the Congress’ continuing effort to modify the 
legislation. This has made the rules of origin in AGOA complicated, which again has made it 
difficult for African countries to take advantage of the trade act. Problems are also identified on 
the supply side, as it takes time to respond to new incentives and potential entrepreneurs were 
not sure how long the incentives would remain in place (ibid).  
The tenth AGOA conference was held in Zambia in 2011 (AGOA Civil Society Forum, 2011). 
Although, Zambia has been AGOA eligible for textiles since December 2001, and has preferences 
for apparel manufacturing with inputs from third countries under specific rules, this has not 
translated into significant trade gain. Zambia has not taken advantage of textile or garment 
export under AGOA since the Mulungushi Textiles closed down production in 200638 (Chutha 
and Kimenyi, 2011:21; USITC, 2009:3-19, 4-77). The AGOA Civil Society Forum (2011) in Zambia 
voiced concerns about termination of the multi- fibre provision39 in 2012 and the expiration of 
AGOA's preferential market in 2015. Currently, only South Africa has the capacity to source 
textiles externally for their garment industry; they are, however, not eligible for the third 
country multi-fibre provision (Times of Zambia, 31 May 2011). Both deadlines create major 
challenges for the sustainability of trade gains and the civil society in Zambia is pushing for 
extending them (AGOA Civil Society Forum, 2011). The USA Department Africa Bureau 
prioritises to extend AGOA’s preferential market throughout 2025 and lengthen the third 
country multi-fibre provision to 2022 (Times of Zambia, 31 May 2011). If also South Africa is 
granted the third country multi-fibre provision, this can be an important incentive to invest in 
textile production in AGOA eligible countries such as Zambia, who would benefit for having a 
regional market for their textiles within SADC (ibid). 
The EBA programme, generally allows duty-free and quota-free entry into the EU for all goods 
from LDCs except armaments (Brautigam, 2009:96). EU has previously been a major destination 
of Zambian TC exports, but the percentage market share has steadily declined from 53 per cent 
in 1999 to 26 per cent in 2004 (Koyi 2006:267). The EBA disappointments mainly came from the 
complex rules of origin; granting duty-free access to products made only from inputs from the 
same region (Brautigam, 2009:96; USITC, 2009:3-20). Under strict rules of origin, garments 
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exported from Africa generally have to been made from strictly African sub-sectors such as 
African produced textiles, buttons, zippers and even pocket lining; which will not be feasible for 
African countries to produce in the liberal TC market40. 
Zambia’s membership in COME A and  ADC offer preferential market access to 25 regional 
markets (USITC, 2009:4-78). Overlapping membership is a significant obstacle to achieve 
regional integration, and has led to conflicting goals and limited progress in both SADC and 
COMESA (Khandelwal, 2004:4). Both institutions are implementing a free trade area and have 
plans to form customs unions; but progress in COMESA has been limited to country-level 
implementation problems, while progress in SADC has been hampered by complicated and 
restrictive rules of origin (ibid). Issues also relate to countries being at different economic 
stages. Member countries within SADC and COMESA includes countries who have specialised 
within the TC sector, such as Kenya, South Africa, Mauritius and Egypt, which will provide hard 
competition for Zambian produced TC products (RATES, 2003:8). Although, the Zambian 
government has pushed for better integration into regional groups as COMESA and SADC, it will 
be difficult for Zambia to compete given the free trade agreements an academic interviewee 
argued (Interview 1). Furthermore, Kenyan producers are able to take advantage of the COMESA 
market, while Zambia will have to reduce tariffs under the free trade area and will not be able to 
compete with those who have specialised. Overall, the regional market for TC products has also 
contracted, and countries as Zambia should opt to specialise to stimulate regional industrial 
links.  
4. China’s failed engagement in Zambia’s TC industry 
4.1. Incentives for investing in TC in Zambia? 
The Chinese economy is restructuring, and the Chinese government aims to shift labour 
intensive and less competitive industrial activities abroad (Brautigam and Tang, 2010). In 2006, 
the Chinese Ministry of Finance and Commerce established a special fund Chinese textile 
companies could draw on to encourage them to move offshore, while costs for those textile 
producers who stayed in China increased (Brautigam, 2009:91). In this context, Chinese textile 
companies either had to give up their labour intensive production at home, upgrade technology 
and product quality or move production. Also part of the restructuring plan, the FOCAC 2006 
summit announced the creation of special economic zones in Africa and the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADFund), to help Chinese companies moving abroad, and by the same time 
help Africa’s shortage of consumer goods (ibid). 
Zambia has become a more attractive destination for Chinese FDI (Muneku, 2009:165; Van der 
Lugt et al, 2011:55, 57). An explanation for the surge of Chinese migration to Zambia relates to 
the historical ties between the countries going back to independence in 1964. Along with other 
development projects in the 1970s, the Mulungishi Textiles was built with Chinese aid between 
1977 and 1981, and operated between 1982 and 1996 as a parastatal company (for more 
information see Mwanawina, 2008; Muneku, 2009; Brautigam, 2009). Zambia has a long record 
of peace compared to the neighbouring countries. Abundance of natural resources, largely 
untapped markets, the lack of competitors and the opportunity of learning how to 
internationalise, are all factors pulling Chinese companies to African countries (Kragelund, 
2009b:480; Carmody and Hampwaye, 2010:92). Relaxed laws and regulations in Zambia, due to 
institutional problems and corruption, could also be seen as a motivation for investing in the 
country (Interview 8). 
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The Chinese government is often criticised for concentrating the bulk of investments in 
resource-rich countries characterised by high-risk governance environment and less 
competition (Van der Lugt et al, 2011:26). Compared to investments in capital-intensive 
industries such as in the mining sector; the TC industry may be associated with less financial 
risks. Access to natural resources and a large informal sector in Zambia, may act as a motivation 
for Chinese actors investing in the TC industry. After all, those labour intensive industries unable 
to upgrade, are the ones currently being pushed out of China (Brautigam, 2009:91). Chinese 
companies (SOE and private) in the TC sector are usually mature industrial actors, which 
potentially could provide learning opportunities for the industry in Zambia (Brautigam, 2009). 
Access to cotton, create the potential for industrial links and ultimately to maximise benefits 
through controlling the whole cotton-textile-clothing value chain (ibid). Helping Zambia 
reinvigorate its manufacturing sector is one way of achieving access to resources through 
consent (Carmody, 2010:91). 
The agreement to build economic zones in Zambia includes not only high technological zones, 
but also industrial parks and MFEZs for light industrial activity. This support has the potential to 
build capacity in promoting industrial development of the TC sector and supply links within the 
industry. MFEZ incentives provided by the ZDA are important, as it provides a foundation for 
investors to go to Zambia (Brautigam and Tang, 2010; Kragelund, 2009b:487). Tax benefits for 
investing in economic zones, also makes Zambia an attractive destination for Chinese FDI (Van 
der Lugt et al, 2011:56). 
One of the factors behind China’s economic success lies in the commitment to export. Chinese 
investments in the Zambian TC industry provide Chinese companies with access to local 
Zambian markets, regional markets as well as the global export market (Kragelund, 2007:172). 
Chinese investments would be important if it entails helping Zambian producers meeting 
international quality standards, so that Zambia can expand trade and make use of trade 
agreements (Kragelund, 2007:175). Agreements at an international scale (EBA and AGOA) as 
well as at a regional level (SADC and COMESA), potentially offer Zambia preferential export 
access of products within the TC sector. This could act as an incentive to invest in the Zambian 
TC sector, although it does not make up for the loss of preferences previously provided by the 
MFA (Kragelund and van Dijk, 2009:94). However, these preferences reduced in value as the 
industry liberalised. From a Chinese perspective, it was no longer necessary to make use of 
Zambia’s preferential trade agreements to access markets in the West after 2008 (Brautigam, 
2009:216; Van Dijk, 2009b 168). Incentives for investments in Zambia’s TC industry thus have to 
be elsewhere.   
4.2. Supportive institutions and organisation of Chinese companies  
Chinese institutions are instrumental in reducing risk for Chinese companies to operate in a 
foreign setting. The spread of Chinese companies throughout Zambia is not accidental.  Support 
and guidance by the Chinese government at home, in Zambia and at different levels, have made 
this tendency possible (Kragelund, 2009a:649). Through official state visits, the Chinese and 
Zambian government negotiate terms of Chinese investments (ibid). At the highest level, the 
government of China supports Chinese investors in Zambia through FOCAC (Muneku, 2009:168; 
Mwanawina, 2008). The Zambian political elite provides Chinese investors with a very direct 
channel of communication with Zambian authorities, which may have facilitated advantageous 
investment terms compared to other investors (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009:126; 
Mwanawina, 2008:24).   
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The Chinese government has set up concrete supportive measures to support Chinese investors 
in their day-to-day activities in Zambia. The most important institution for Chinese investors in 
Zambia is the Chinese Embassy, in particularly the Economic Counsellor's Office, which help 
facilitate a positive attitude towards Chinese investors among the political elite and authorities 
in Zambia, provides investment opportunities and advise for investors, and makes inter-Chinese 
cooperation possible (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009:126; Kragelund, 2009b:486). The Embassy 
is the extended arm of the Chinese political leadership and directly involved in investment 
negotiations (ibid).  
The Association of Chinese Companies in Zambia (ACCZ) falls under authority of the Economic 
Counsellor’s Office in Zambia (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009 12 ). Established in 2005, it 
functions as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Zambia with around sixty Chinese member 
companies. The ACCZ takes care of the interests of Chinese companies in Zambia vis-à-vis the 
Zambian public and Zambian authorities, through communicating and promoting the cause of 
Chinese investors directly involved with local authorities and indirectly through public media 
(ibid). The ACCZ is also instructing its members on Zambia's rules and regulations and on the 
Chinese Embassy's behalf it handles immigration and labour cases for Chinese companies 
(Kragelund, 2009b:487; Mwanawina, 2008:18; Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009:127).  
The Chinese Centre for Investment Promotion and Trade (CCIPT) was established in 2002, and 
like ACCZ, a parastatal organisation built by the MOFCOM, seeking to smoothen the process of 
Chinese companies in Zambia (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009:127). The CCIPT role is to 
promote Chinese investments in Zambia, identify suitable investment projects and provide 
practical support to newly established Chinese companies with such as accommodation, 
transport and communication. The CCIPT also help facilitate contacts with relevant Zambian 
authorities for potential or newly arrived Chinese investors (ibid). 
In 1997, the state-owned commercial Bank of China (BOC) opened a branch in Zambia, as the 
first Chinese financial institution in SSA, with the purpose of facilitating operations of Chinese 
investors and facilitate day-to-day activities of Chinese companies in Zambia (Brautigam, 
2009:82). The BOC has not made any profits and is used for facilitating daily banking operations, 
and is in this way a strategic investment that reduces difficulties Chinese investors may have to 
manage their banking affairs in a foreign setting (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009:127). 
Most development projects, including essential infrastructure to industrial zones, are financed 
by the Chinese Export Import Bank (Exim Bank), established in 1994 to back international 
economic cooperation by providing preferential loans41. Exim Bank is potentially important for 
African development, as it provides a new source of capital especially in the much needed 
infrastructure sector, where deliberate state policies are used to accelerate development 
(Mwanawina, 2008:3; Brautigam, 2009:80). Exim Bank is state-owned, and has rapidly has 
become one of the largest export credit agencies, although it operates independently of 
prevailing export credit rules (Large, 2007). Other policy banks include the China Development 
Bank (CDB), as the managing entity for the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund), created 
in 200642 (Grimm et al, 2011:18).  
CDB set up a Zambian team to provide funding and support for Chinese industrial zones and the 
China Nonferrous Metals Corporation (CNMC) activities in Zambia, although the CADFund did 
not invest directly in the Chinese pilot zones 43(Brautigam and Tang, 2011:34). The industrial 
zones will directly benefit the state-owned company CNMC, which has been assign by the 
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Chinese government to manage the zones and attract private investments (Bastholm and 
Kragelund, 2009:127). 
The composition of Chinese FDI is dominated by large, state-led, policy driven and publicly 
owned companies, although small-scale investments have gained more importance (Kopinski 
and Polus, 2011:185). While some Chinese companies benefit from large-scale investments of 
SOEs, others are not related to these investments at all. These have rather been pushed out of 
China due to increasing demand for technological capabilities and lower profit margins 
(Kragelund, 2009b:493). It is challenging to gain an overview over Chinese individuals providing 
small-scale investments in Zambia, as the Chinese institutions in place mainly support large-
scale investments. The majority of small-scale Chinese companies approach Zambian authorities 
directly, thereby bypassing two central institutions, leaving the Chinese Embassy and the 
Economic Counsellor’s Office unaware of the scale of Chinese small-scale investments in Zambia 
(Kragelund, 2009b:486). 
A response to complaints from the private industry and citizens in Zambia to facilitate greater 
business and investment creation outside Lusaka, was the establishment of the Zambian Patents 
and Company Registration Office (PACRO) under the FNDP (FNDP, 2006:37). PACRO was set to 
enhance the operating framework for business facilitation in Zambia, with provincial offices 
intended to remove administrative barriers to business and investment entry, operating in and 
outside Lusaka44 (ibid). A list from the PACRO head office Lusaka in June 2011, listed 542 
Chinese companies in Zambia45. Most of them established from 1992 onwards in the areas of 
general trading, import/export, construction, mining related business, manufacturing and 
farming. Based on the PACRO list, it is not possible to identify which or how many companies 
directly involved in TC manufacturing. According to information from the PACRO head office, 
some Chinese investors register a company and only then choose what type of business to set up 
(Interview 10). As a part of overcoming bureaucracy, companies register their overall activity, 
for example in manufacturing, and do not specify what they will manufacture to avoid going 
back to PACRO to register again (ibid)46.  
4.3. Chinese companies in the Zambian TC industry – few and no success 
Mapping the Zambian TC industry and Chinese companies in Zambia, this paper found only two 
instances of Chinese investments in the Zambian TC industry: the joint venture Zambia-China 
Mulungushi Textiles (ZCMT) and TC production in the economic zone, Lusaka East MFEZ. 
The Mulungushi Textiles was initially built by Chinese aid in late 1970s. From 1982 to 1996, it 
operated as a Zambian parastatal, where the Zambian government was assisted by Chinese 
technicians; but closed already in 1994 due to mismanagement and financial difficulties during a 
period of national economic crisis affecting manufacturers (Brooks, 2010:114; Muneku, 
2009:171). From 1997 the factory ran under the name Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles 
(ZCMT), a joint venture between the Zambian government and the Chinese state-owned 
company, Qingdao Corporation. ZCMT closed in 2007, and does thus no longer contribute to 
economic development. Yet, the reasons for the closure will be explored in greater detail, as it 
may provide insights to earlier raised questions of impact on economic development. Secondly, 
as part of moving industry through building economic zones, Chinese investors are planning TC 
integrated industries in Lusaka East MFEZ. The zone is currently under constructions; expected 
impact of the project will be measured according to available information so far in the process.   
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4.3.1. Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles – joint venture in the TC industry  
In 1995, then-Chinese vice-premier Zhu Rongji suggested to turn the Mulungushi factory into a 
Zambia-China joint venture, to bring the factory back to life (People’s Daily China, 2  November 
2003; Taylor, 2006). After negotiations with the Zambian government, the outstanding loan of 
the initial investment in the factory in 1982, plus USD 1.5 million in additional capital for 
overhaul of the factory, was turned into a 66 per cent stake in the company; the Zambian part of 
34 per cent was held through the Ministry of Defence (Muneku, 2009:171; Brooks, 
2010:114,115). The investment to rehabilitate the factory was provided by Qingdao Textile 
Corporation, a Chinese SOE that is considered a mature industrial actor being over a century old, 
originating from the Qingdao City Centre of intensive clothing manufacturing on China’s eastern 
seaboard (Brooks, 2010:114; Qingdao Textiles website, 2011). To ensure the new joint venture 
had enough operating funds, Yuan 200 million in low interest loan was provided (People's Daily 
China, 27 November 2003). Kabwe Business News (2010) notes the recapitalisation was 
arranged through investment of USD 24 million, obtained from Exim Bank of China.  
Qingdao's investment was initially welcomed and seen as a fresh localised opportunity for 
development in Kabwe, as it was associated with re-employment and new employment at the 
factory (Brooks, 2010:119). Kabwe is a mining centre that declined economically and socially 
after closure of industry in the 1980s and 1990s (ibid). The Chinese investments in Mulungushi 
Textiles came at a time when other international investors were reluctant to commit to the 
declining Zambian economy; the factory reopened in 1997, at a time when Chinese corporations 
invested in African textile industries as it was clear that the MFA was set to expire in 2005, 
meaning the end of exporting under quota restrictions (Melber, 2007; van Dijk, 2009b:167).  
From January 1997, about thirty management and technical staff from Qingdao Textile 
Corporation came to Zambia, using about twenty days to restart the factory, drafting new rules 
and regulations, repairing equipment and recruiting workers (People’s Daily China, 2  
November 2003; Taylor, 2006:178). The main management positions, chairman of the board of 
directors and general manager were Chinese (ibid). 
After the resumption of production, the first problems at the factory related to poor product 
quality, low efficiency, insufficient varieties of products and long delivery periods (People’s Daily 
China, 27 November 2003; Taylor, 2006:178). This indicated the need for replacing out-dated 
equipment and technology. Over the first six years, the company spent about USD 20 million on 
new spinning, weaving, dyeing and printing machines plus computer auxiliary design systems; 
which improved the quality and variety of products. The second problem for ZCMT was 
supplying cotton for the factory as a monopoly over the raw cotton market in Zambia made it 
difficult for ZCMT to source it locally at a reasonable price. This forced the factory to import 
cotton from Tanzania, which resulted in higher costs. The problem of sourcing reasonable priced 
cotton for ZCMT led to its own engagement in cotton production in 1998 (ibid). 
Chinese investors at ZCMT solved problems of cost and efficiency, in line with theory of 
interconnected businesses, by forming downstream companies and thereby obtaining control 
over the sub-sectors in the TC industry. Companies that ZCMT used as its subsidiaries, based on 
Kabwe Business News (2010:12), were: 
 Mulungushi Textiles Development Company Limited  
 Mulungushi Cotton and Cooking Oil Company Limited  
 Mulungushi Garment  
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 Flamingo Bedding Company Limited  
 International Trade Centre  
 Chipata Cotton Company Ltd47  
Within a few years, ZCMT became Zambia's largest textile company, and the only company that 
grew cotton. Through 5,000 contracted farmers, it controlled 10,000 hectares of cotton farms, 
and was engaged in ginning and spinning cotton, weaving yarn into textiles and producing 
garments; controlling the whole supply chain from cotton to finished garments (Kragelund and 
van Dijk, 2009:94). ZCMT's main activity was the production of textiles with African prints 
known as chitenge48 in Zambia, commonly used all over Africa and among the African diaspora 
(Kabwe Business News, 2010). The factory also produced drills, poplins and loom state to add 
value to textile products, in addition to making shirts, shorts, bed sheets and modern khaki 
fabrics (ibid). ZCMT provided cotton farmers with out-grower schemes49, and was by 2002 the 
third largest cotton purchaser in Zambia, buying 9,000 tonnes of cotton in 2002 and 5,000 
tonnes in 2003 (People's Daily China, 27 November 2003; Taylor 2006:178).  
Domestic markets were reached through retail markets in Kabwe, Chipata, Lusaka, Kasama, 
Solwezi and through a number of satellite shops (Kabwe Business News, 2010). Through a 
marketing network, ZCMT had 18 stores around Zambia, with two subsidiary companies in 
Tanzania and Namibia, and ZCMT products was sold throughout Southern Africa (People's Daily 
China, 27 November 2003; Taylor, 2006:178). To further generate foreign exchange, ZCMT 
exported fabrics to Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Kabwe Business 
News, 2010). In addition to meet own cotton demand, ZCMT exported 2,000 tonnes of cotton 
from 2002 to 2003 due to high demand in China (People's Daily, 27 November 2003). 
The only record of ZCMT taking advantage of AGOA was in 2000, delivering 11,000 shorts to 
USA; being the largest single export of textile products to USA by a Zambian company (Taylor, 
2006:178). ZCMT has historically been the largest TC manufacturing cluster set up in Zambia, 
hence the only company with capacity to produce according to international standards at a large 
scale. Two agreements were made in 2003 to finance expansion of production and make use of 
AGOA preferences, the first with Wyler Team International Corporation50; the second between 
the Zambian and Chinese government to build an industrial park with interconnected TC 
business linked to ZCMT (People's Daily China, 27 November 2003; Taylor 2006:178; Daily Mail 
Zambia, 10 November 2003). However, none of the planned ZCMT expansions did happen. ZCMT 
ceased production in December 2006, while workers were retrenched between November 2006 
and February 2007 (Brooks, 2010:129). The Chinese management suspended business due to 
operational challenges (Kabwe Business News, 2010). The closure of ZCMT also resulted in 
problems for the integrated supply industries; most of them also closed down production. 
Mwanawina (2008:8) argues Chinese investment in the cotton sector is yet to yield positive 
results and of concern is that these are still pure raw materials with little or no benefit to 
Zambia. Two Chinese companies are still involved in cotton production, the Chipata Cotton 
Company and the Mulungushi Cotton and Cooking Oil Company, where the latter exports cotton 
to China (Brooks, 2010:120). The Post of Zambia (26 June 2011) reported that workers at the 
Chipata Cotton Company were complaining about low wages and bad working conditions.  
Employment creation was an important question prior to the election in October 2011, and 
news reports should thus be seen in the light of pre-election campaigning. According to the Post 
of Zambia (26 January 2011), Mulungushi Textile factory had been turned into a piggery and 
poultry. The Zambian government refuted this as a false media report by (then opposition 
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leader, now president) Michael Sata, stating that the Chinese government was searching for a 
suitable company to invest in and replace equipment at ZCMT, according to the newsite 
UrTextile (27 January 2011). Lusaka Times (28 March 2011) wrote before the presidential 
election that President Banda announced negotiations of reopening the factory. By April 2012, it 
was clear that the Chinese government no longer was supporting troubled ZCMT (Times of 
Zambia, 5 April 2012). Furthermore, the Zambian government is now in the process of acquiring 
100 per cent of the shares of the company and resolving issues of outstanding debt (ibid). 
Negotiations about reopening the ZCMT did not succeed. ZCMT is locally described as “a white 
elephant”, needed for a resemblance of industrial life in Kabwe (Kabwe Business News, 2010).  
4.3.2. Reasons for Zambia China Mulungushi Textile’s failure 
The Chinese investment in the Mulungushi Textiles is usually held up as the example of 
successful cooperation between China and Zambia, alongside the TAZARA (Taylor, 2006:178). 
There are several discussions explaining what caused the factory to close.  
As already explored, international factors such as the end of MFA in 2005 and liberalisation of 
the Zambia economy, caused heavy external competition for TC producers in Zambia, ultimately 
also to the ZCMT, who had to compete globally according to price and quality. Kabwe Business 
News (2010:13) explains the closure of ZCMT with undercapitalisation51 of the factory, similar 
to reasons for the first closure of the factory in 1996 (Koyi, 2006). The problem of 
undercapitalisation was due to high costs of production, unfair competition, obsolete equipment, 
erratic supply of raw materials, failure of clients so settle debt, in addition to a bloated 
workforce (Kabwe Business News, 2010:13). Although, efforts were made to attract investments 
for recapitalisation, in addition to effort made by management and shareholders to revive the 
factory, it was not enough for the factory to remain in production (ibid).  
Koyi (2006:269) argues the Chinese investments in ZCMT were presented as an intervention to 
revive a collapsed factory, but was in reality a case of systematic quota hopping. ZCMT provided 
Qingdao Corporation with an export market for the produced goods through AGOA (ibid). By 
late 2008, the temporary restrictions for Chinese TC products into U A and EU’s markets were 
removed under the WTO (Brautigam, 2009:216). Chinese companies no longer needed to 
manufacture in African countries with preferential market access, as Chinese TC products could 
be exported directly to markets in the West. As seen by 2008, production at the ZCMT factory 
was already history in Zambia.  
According to Brooks (2010:130) the ZCMT trading strategies developed into new structural 
means for surplus extraction, where the Chinese management extracted profits from Zambia to 
the parent Qingdao Corporation in China. An academic interviewee claimed that the quality of 
products from ZCMT after the Chinese take-over declined, and the ZCMT factory store outlet in 
Lusaka experienced that printed textiles faded and were of lower durability than previously 
(Interview 1). Brooks (2010:130) explains the Zambian government had allowed the Qingdao 
Textile Company to export higher-quality ginned cotton to China through Mulungushi Cotton, 
where cotton used at ZCMT was of lower quality. In this way, the Qingdao Textile Corporation 
supported China’s great demand for cotton, while importing duty-free spare parts from China 
for ZCMT. Consumer items such as clothing and televisions were reported covertly imported 
from China and sold in Chinese-owned shops that used the Mulungushi name (ibid). 
Muneku and Koyi (2008) argue perpetual reorganization at the textile plant, brought about job 
losses and suffering for workers. Mutesa (2010:172) highlights disparities in salaries between 
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Chinese and Zambian workers performing the same tasks; the Chinese assistant general 
manager was paid about Kwacha 17 million while the Zambian deputy general manager got 
Kwacha 3.5 million. Already in 2004, the Zambian government had demanded the management 
at ZCMT to not lock workers into the factory at night (the Frankfurter Rundschau of 5-2-2007; 
cited in Asche and Schüller, 2008:60). When then-president Hu Jintao visited Zambia in 
February 2007, the anti-Chinese feelings in Zambia were at the level of xenophobia, with part of 
the protest by former ZCMT workers, who planned to protest the closure and lack of payments 
(Mutesa, 2010:177). These protests were stopped by the police (ibid). Asche and Schüller 
(2008:60) argue workers at ZCMT protested outside the Chinese Embassy because of low wages 
and temporary closure of the factory in 2007. Based on Brooks (2010) detailed ethnographic 
research among ex-factory workers at ZCMT, working conditions and low wages are highlighted 
as key issues to explain the closure of the factory. Brooks (2010) key points to explain the 
closure includes: 
 Introduction of casual labour practices, where the workforce was divided in permanent 
and casual workers. The group of casual workers was gradually expanded, workers were 
easily replaced, the management ignored social wage and access to basic services and 
protection, workers received low or no wage and preformed repetitive tasks. 
 The Chinese management pushed for increased production through close supervision, 
restriction on movement of workers, using machines to lower costs, and to control and 
discipline the workers. 
 Low wages and bad working conditions did not fulfil Zambian workers expectation of 
modernity, and workers had to seek alternative employment to sustain a livelihood52. 
Workers tried negotiating better wage, without success, which led to riots and strikes.  
 Issues with language, cultural difference and lack of interaction led to misconceptions 
and negative perceptions about the Chinese management by the Zambian workforce. 
 The Zambian government introduced a minimum wage in 2006, which made wage levels 
at ZCMT illegal. The Chinese management answered with paying the minimum wage of 
Kwacha 268,000; although, efforts to supress wages still continued, leaving the workers 
to feel betrayed. As a result, labour unrest was re-ignited up until closure (from Brooks, 
2010). 
An academic interviewee explains that industrial unrest from two levels caused the factory to 
close (Interview 2). One, workers laid off while the factory was under the Zambian government, 
were by law entitled to get paid. As these former workers were not paid, they put pressure on 
the new Chinese owners. At the same time, the workforce that had remained employed at the 
factory under Chinese management, started to push for better wages and terms of employment. 
The factory needed to improve existing equipment and was not back on its feet, before the 
workers started demanding (ibid).  
Despite transfer of technology and building interconnected businesses, the Qingdao 
Corporation's investment failed to deliver local economic growth and material benefit. Labour 
reforms, rather than a high wage model with welfare policies, were seen as key to run an 
efficient and profitable business (Brooks, 2010). Casual employment at the ZCMT was often not 
enough to sustain a livelihood, did not contribute to state revenue through employment taxes, or 
transfer skills leaving Zambian workers better equipped in the future. Restrictions on the 
workplace, repetitive jobs and limited interaction with the Chinese management, do not support 
evidence of skill transfer to Zambian workers. The market created for TC products was also lost 
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with ZCMT’s closure.  
Although, TC industry is a starter industry for industrialisation as it absorbs large segments of 
unskilled labour, the Zambian workers at ZCMT did not the accept terms of employment. In this 
way, the strict labour regime has not worked in Zambia for low-cost producers, contrary to 
positive experiences in the sector in China. 
4.3.3. Lusaka East Multi Facility Economic Zone 
A second possibility for the promotion of TC industry could be the establishment of a Multi-
Facility Economic Zone. The Lusaka East MFEZ is important as the first light industrial zone in 
Zambia, setting up production for domestic and export markets, and tailored to accelerate 
diversification of Zambia’s export sector ( hout- Africa, 11 August 2010). Lusaka East MFEZ is 
considered a sub-zone of the Chambishi MFEZ in the Copperbelt, and was inaugurated with USD 
500 million in January 2009 close to the Lusaka International Airport53 (Kragelund, 2009b:487). 
The zone aims to focus on service and light industrial clusters54, which include textiles and its 
supportive links (MOFCOM, 13 May 2011). The government of Zambia is also planning cotton 
clusters, which might feed into the industrial cluster (ZDA, 2008). In this way, Chinese 
investments are in line with Zambian national development priorities, by building 
manufacturing activities to improve local consumption of natural resources.  
Completion of the Master Plan for the Lusaka East MFEZ was wrapped up at the end of 2009, 
with construction scheduled to commence in 2010 (Kragelund, 2009b). In mid-2011, the land 
was cleared and the process of building roads had begun. Alves (2011:3) notes that almost three 
years after its launch, the zone was still at an early stage of infrastructure construction. As there 
were reports about interested entrepreneurs, the Lusaka East MFEZ was expected to start 
receiving investors by April 2012 (ibid). 
Relating development of the zone, information from fieldwork shows that the ZDA and the local 
Zambian government, Lusaka City Council, are involved in developing the Master Plan for the 
zone, in addition Alves (2011) adds the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry and the 
Ministry of Finance on the Zambian side. Part of the process of developing the Master Plan on 
the Chinese side includes the Zambia-China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), who also is responsible 
for the construction and development of the zone (MCTI, 2011:15). The state-owned China 
Nonferrous Metals Corporation (CNMC), plays a key role in managing the ZCCZ, and CNMC is 
supported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Association of Chinese SEZ and the local 
Chinese Embassy in Lusaka (Alves, 2011). The ZCCZ is responsible for providing infrastructure, 
including roads, telecommunications, electricity, water supply and facilities for administration, 
commerce, exhibitions and training, in addition to attracting private investors for the zone 
(Alves, 2011:3). Based on information from a Zambian government official, only Chinese 
companies are planned for the zone so far (Interview 4).   Looking at the 
impact on economic development, the Lusaka East MFEZ is expected to create 13,300 jobs 
(Alves, 2011:3). It is also hoped that the zone will lead to technology transfer, as the MFEZ Act 
incentives include 0% import duty on machinery for five years, deferment of VAT on machinery 
and equipment imports (MCTI, 2011). It can also be expected that the Lusaka East MFEZ will 
support market creation and trade in TC products, as the zone’s production is planned for the 
domestic and export market. In contrast, the zone will have a limited impact on state revenue 
through tax earnings for the host government in the early phases55. While, lack of duty on import 
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of raw materials might not encourage local consumption of specifically cotton (ibid). Serious 
obstacles might limit the prospects for success of the zone, not only with regard to TC industries.  
According to Alves (2011) obstacles relate to implementation more than to policy and design; 
there was need to make the process less elitist and secretive. Due to loose regulations on local 
content, language and culture barriers between Zambians and Chinese; Chinese investors tend 
to rely on own supply chains as a much cheaper option (Alves, 2011:4). Specifically labour 
practises, as there is a large gap between Chinese practises (longer hours, lower salaries and 
safety standards) and local work ethics (shaped by Western standards) have caused serious 
misunderstandings in Zambia in the past, and should be tacked before the Lusaka East MFEZ 
becomes operational (ibid). Questions have been raided about domestic spill-overs, as the 
investment target is USD 500,000 for setting up a business in a MFEZ, and thereby too high for 
the majority of the Zambian business community to take part (Interview 12; Clarke et al, 2010). 
Brautigam and Tang (2010:48) note from experience with other economic zones in Africa that 
training programmes are yet too short to enable African officials to acquire the skills needed to 
operate in the zones. Furthermore, too much local participation too early in the process of 
setting up a MFEZ, may hinder the ability for the zone to be successfully launched (Brautigam 
and Tang, 2010:47). Also from experience with zones in Africa, Giannecchini (2011:13) suggests 
as increased domestic involvement in these MFEZs beyond lower skilled employment and the 
supply of raw materials remains low; locals should rather invest in links around the MFEZ, to 
provide supply links to the industries located within.  
When the Lusaka East MFEZ is complete, it may serve to transfer technology, generate local 
employment and help market creation through TC trade, according to a Zambian government 
official (Interview 4). Yet as critics note, the MFEZ could turn out to advance Chinese interest 
through manufacturing Zambia’s natural resources without links to African development 
objectives (Brautigam and Tang, 2010:49; Giannecchini, 2011:13). For the Lusaka East MFEZ to 
benefit the Zambian economy, the government needs to address employment creation and 
develop supply programmes between the zone and domestic sectors. 
 
5. Are Chinese investments saving Zambia’s TC industry? 
This paper set out to further our understanding of how Chinese investments in the Zambian TC 
industry impacts economic development, as a sector important for employment creation and 
ultimately poverty alleviation. Although, Chinese investments in the Zambian TC industry offer 
opportunities for economic development; this paper shows that Chinese investments in the 
sector failed. Through mapping the Zambian TC industry and Chinese companies in Zambia, this 
paper found only two instances of Chinese investments in the Zambian TC industry, being the 
joint venture Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles (ZCMT) and TC production planned for the 
economic zone, Lusaka East MFEZ.  
Initially, ZCMT successfully sold TC products domestically, regionally and internationally 
through AGOA, but closed down production in late 2006. The most important factor explaining 
the ZCMT closure, relate to the impact of liberalisation of the TC industry in 2005 and 
undercapitalisation at the factory. The factory was unable to produce cost effectively in the 
international market, and the Chinese management had to take measures to reduce costs. 
Compared to Chinese labour practises in the mining industry, also reorganisation of the 
workforce at ZCMT brought job losses and suffering for workers. Casualisation of the workforce 
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meant that workers were easily replaced, the management ignored access to basic services and 
protection, and workers complained over low wages. Casual employment at the ZCMT was often 
not enough to sustain a livelihood, or transfer skills leaving Zambian workers better equipped in 
the future. Also, framework conditions for the TC industry in Zambia changed rapidly. By late 
2008, the temporary restrictions for Chinese TC products to the West were removed under the 
WTO; Chinese companies no longer needed to manufacture in Zambia to reach markets in the 
West. Although, ZCMT successfully created industrial links to provide control over all the factors 
in TC production; the plant was not profitable enough and terms of employment not acceptable 
for the Zambian workforce. 
The second Chinese investment, the Lusaka East MFEZ, does not contribute to economic 
development, as not yet operational. However, a number of challenges related to local impact 
and implementation have been raised: regarding local employment creation, supply links to 
domestic sectors and benefit for local entrepreneurs. A large gap between Chinese labour 
practices and local work ethics has caused serious misunderstandings in Zambia in the past, and 
should be tacked before the Lusaka East MFEZ becomes operational. When the Lusaka East 
MFEZ is complete, it may serve to transfer technology, generate local employment and help 
market creation through TC trade; yet as critics note, the MFEZ could turn out to be a tool to 
advance Chinese interest through manufacturing Zambia’s natural resources, without links to 
African development objectives. Therefore, it is up to the Zambian government to set terms, 
make the process less secretive, address some of the contextual factors and provide clear 
leadership in terms of creating acceptable and poverty reducing employment in the TC sector.  
Through national plans (FNDP and SNDP), the Zambian government aims to link investors to the 
needs in the domestic economy, diversify the economic base, create employment, and ultimately 
reduce poverty. On the positive side, the plans have removed administrative barriers to 
establish businesses in Zambia, addressed infrastructural deficits, improved regulatory 
frameworks, created the MFEZ initiative to foster investment into manufacturing activities, and 
overall improved the business environment for foreign investors. In this way, the Zambian 
government has established a foundation that will ease economic development in the future. 
However, the FNDP proposed a general approach to tackle some of the constraints faced by the 
manufacturing sector, and lacked targets and strategies to build manufacturing sub-sectors, such 
as the TC industry. Although, the FNDP (2006-2010) focused on attracting investments to 
stimulate economic growth and poverty alleviation through employment creation, the sub-
sector showing the most negative growth within the manufacturing sector was textile and 
leather products between 2005 and 2009. The SNDP was more targeted and an improvement 
over the previous development plan. However, a lack of implementation make the national 
development plans mostly theory.  
The initiative to establish dedicated economic zones (MFEZs) is important in terms of providing 
a foundation for investors wanting to establish light industrial production in Zambia and 
keeping the area manageable for Zambian administration. Establishment of the Zambian 
Development Agency (ZDA) was certainly a positive step. The ZDA is responsible for regulating 
and implementing the MFEZ initiatives, which are seen as new economic strategies for economic 
development through catalysing industrial activity. The MFEZ initiative is important as it 
attracts larger scale investments for business activity in the manufacturing sector for the longer 
term; which may lead to employment creation, technology transfer and expanded opportunities 
to benefit from trade. On the others side, challenges are linked developing supply links between 
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the MFEZs and domestic industries, the accessibility for locals businesses to enjoy incentives for 
business creation, and employment creation for local workers in the zones. Although, there have 
been some changes in the MFEZ regulations for the sake of national benefit, and as it is too early 
to fully grasp impact of MFEZs for economic development; it needs to be a clear link between 
foreign investments and national benefit in terms of employment creation and domestic value 
addition.  
Looking at the current state of the Zambian TC industry, market liberalisation has had a positive 
impact on cotton production, which has grown and become international competitive in terms of 
price and quality. However, liberalisation has led to large foreign ownership in the cotton sector. 
While large foreign ownership might make local consumption and benefit of cotton difficult; 
there are only four textile mills left in Zambia. Domestic capacity to add value is thus very 
limited, and ultimately demands for investments in integrated industries to improve local 
consumption of cotton. Due to the competitive pressure in the liberal TC market, Zambia’s 
demand for TC products is met rather by imports of cheap consumer goods from China and 
other Asian producers, and by second-hand clothes from the West, leaving the domestic textile 
industry is limbo. Cotton exports to China have not appeared in official statistics; figures of 2011 
show that TC products contribute little to the overall export from Zambia. 
Factors contributing negatively to the growth of a TC industry and where policy is needed, 
include firstly, unrestricted TC imports take over the market for domestic produced products 
and creates a difficult environment for Zambian TC producers to compete. Secondly, the textile 
industry needs investments to upgrade machinery and technology to produce according to 
international standards and to absorb local cotton. Subsidised cotton in countries as China, USA 
and in Europe, provide an unfair market advantage over TC producers in Zambia, and put 
additional pressure on reducing costs.  Protection of local industry in Zambia is not seen as an 
option due to the commitment to a liberal investment climate, membership in the WTO and due 
to the history of nationalism in Zambia. In addition, raising TC tariffs in Zambia would reduce 
people’s purchasing power and make the government unpopular.   
Confusing legislation surrounding preferential trade agreements are identified as factors to 
account for to improve prospects for trade. As it is suggested to extend AGOA’s preferential 
market access to 2025, and lengthen the third country multi-fibre provision to 2022, this would 
be important for investments in the Zambian TC industry with opportunities for trade gain. Also, 
if South Africa is granted AGOA multi-fibre provision for their clothing production, it could 
become an important incentive to invest in AGOA eligible countries such as Zambia, who would 
benefit from having a regional market for Zambian produced textiles. It would also be of benefit 
to encourage industrial links regionally, and thereby loosed up strict rules of origin for EBA and 
AGOA. Trade within SADC and COMESA is hampered due to overlapping memberships and hard 
competition between the most specialised and developed economies, compared to less 
specialised TC production in countries such as Zambia. Overall, after trade liberalisation the 
regional market for TC products has contracted, where countries as Zambia should opt to 
specialise to stimulate regional industrial links and to increase competiveness. In this complex 
setting: Can Chinese investors come to the rescue of Zambian TC industry? Based on past 
experience, this seems unlikely.  
There are a number of positive aspects of Chinese engagement, including for the TC industry in 
Zambia. Chinese investors are without question important actors in the Zambian economy in the 
2000s, where the Chinese and Zambian government has developed a set of tools to provide 
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incentives and institutions to help Chinese actors in the Zambian setting. Indirectly, Chinese 
actors in infrastructure and construction sectors are instrumental in supporting economic 
development in the Zambia, and solving some of the contextual factors hindering growth within 
the TC sector. By providing support to improving transportation costs, telecommunication and 
power supply, Chinese actors are ultimately important as reducing the cost of doing business for 
the Zambian TC sector. 
Overall, unfortunately, Chinese investors are not saving the Zambian TC industry, as the projects 
currently do not impact on economic development as measured by this paper. Although, there 
are Chinese actors in the cotton sector, this has little benefit to Zambia. Moreover, Chinese actors 
in the TC industry are not changing the negative impact import of Chinese TC products has on 
national industry. Today the situation is that Zambia exports cotton and in return buys finished 
textile and garment products. In this way, the country loses out in terms of employment creation 
and state revenue; it has not moved up the value chain. As a result, Zambians are pushed into the 
informal economy, which are bad news for national industries and a tragedy for Zambian 
development. Chinese TC producers could make a difference for the Zambian TC industry; 
however, the global competitive pressure and insufficient framework conditions in Zambia have 
prevented textile industry in Zambia from being profitable. As numerous publications highlight, 
the Zambian government needs to take charge, provide strategic plans and concrete leadership 
to diversify the economy and through setting terms for foreign investors to contribute to 
employment creation. In light of the recent financial crisis, employment creation and poverty 
reduction need to be at the centre of national development priorities.  
This paper demonstrated the challenges to industrialise in the context of a liberal market and 
the globalised international economy. This case study explored the dynamics of one of the most 
globalised industries today, the cotton-textile-clothing supply chain, which usually is the first 
point of entry into industrialisation. This study illustrates just how difficult it is for LDCs to make 
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Endnotes: 
                                                             
1
 Between 2002 and 2007 the World Bank’s loans for industry and trade combined less than five per cent of all 
loans made to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Brautigam, 20009:91). Traditional donor countries give less than one 
per cent of their aid to industry (ibid). While the private sector in Europe and USA has largely chosen not to 
invest in African factories (Brautigam, 2009:92). 
2
 The process of Chinese development cooperation is highly complex in detail, as a multiplicity of institutions 
are involved in decision-making and implementation (Asche and Schüller, 2008:31). The most important 
ministry for implementing development cooperation is MOFCOM, which is responsible for both incoming and 
outgoing development-assistance funds and for bilateral development policy. Within MOFCOM there are 
various departments with particular development cooperation responsibilities (ibid). More recent additional 
information, see Grimm et al (2011). 
3
 In this critique to ethnocentrism, Hobson (2004) in his book ”The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization” 
show example of how important sides of the British industrial development within the textile industry was based 
on technology in the Chinese silk industry. Hobson (2004) calls Britain an industrial latecomer, as ideas and 
inventions originated from the east. 
4
  Zambia was classified a middle-income country in 1969 (Ferguson, 1999). Due to the financial crises of the 
1970s, Zambia spiralled down to be classified a LDC (Kragelund, 2009b). In 1996, Zambia qualified for debt 
reduction under the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative (ibid). Zambia is still categorised as a LDC 
and a landlocked developing country by the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least 
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS, 
2012). 
5
 The informal economy accounts is 88 per cent of the total labour force of 4.9 million, aged between 15 and 64 
years (CSOZ, 2007). In 2006, 64 per cent where registered living in poverty, divided on 80 per cent in rural 
poverty, towards 34 per cent living in urban poverty. For more information see Central Statistics Office Zambia 
(2007) “Labour Force Survey Report 2005”, which seems to be the latest updated numbers used by most 
research papers on Zambia. 
6
 The researcher was in contact with the Economic Counsellors office, but unable to make an appointment. 
Former president Frederick Chiluba died during this period; over one week was declared national mourning, 
with official duties for embassy personnel. 
7
 President Kenneth Kaunda followed an African socialist-styled philosophy called “Zambian humanism” 
(Fraser and Lungu, 2007). 
8
 Aid relations are complex in Zambia. For more information see Saasa and Carlson (2002), Fraser (2007) and 
Kragelund (2012). 
9
 Other major sources of FDI include Australia, USA, Switzerland, Canada, South Africa and India, although this 
study focuses on FDI from China (Ndulo et al, 2009:11; van der Lugt, 2011). 
10
 Zambia is one of the countries with the longest relationship with the Chinese government, building an 
embassy in Lusaka in 1964, followed by the TAZARA and the Mulungushi Textile factory in 1960s and 1970s 
(Ferguson, 1999; Taylor, 2006). 
11
 Mercantilism refers to a type of capitalism where the state apparatus is used to advance national business 
interests (Holslag, 2006). China’s “Go out” policy can be placed within this theoretical perspective of neo-
mercantilism, as strong state institutions is used to accelerate own industrialisation (ibid). 
12
 This was discussed during the Second FOCAC Legal Forum held in Beijing in September 2010 (van der Lugt 
et al, 2011:25). 
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13
 The first crash (1999-2000) was a severe credit default crisis, brought on due to a competitive scramble for 
cotton (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010:5,6). Companies operating on out-grower schemes suffered from increased 
loan default as competing firms, some of which did not provide input on credit and, hence could offer higher 
prices, purchased cotton from farmers financed by other firms. This is called side-selling of crops and as a result 
loan repayments dropped. The second crash (2006-2007) is explained by a sharp appreciation of the Kwacha, 
domestic politics, increased firms in the sector leading to another serious credit default crisis and dropping 
production (ibid).  
14
 Great Lakes Cotton Company was not listed in the ZDA (2008), but is noted to be active on the Great Lakes 
Cotton Company’s (2011) webpage. 
15
 These firms also operate in other southern African countries, see more in Tschirley et al (2008). The Zambian 
company Clark Cotton was bought by Cargill Cotton in 2006 (Cargill Cotton webpage, 2011). 
16
 Independent cotton traders are individuals trading in cotton that do not own and are not employed by a ginning 
company (Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010:15). 
17
 Some relocated to countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Botswana and South Africa (Seshami and Simeo, 
2006:3). 
18
 Do not know if the companies Sakiza Spinning Mills Limited, Kays Textiles Limited and Unity Garments are 
operational in 2011. 
19
 Indian investors bought Kafue Textiles under the name African Textiles, and are currently being investigated 
for using the machinery stripped from Kafue Textiles for textile industry in Tanzania (Lusaka Times, 26 April 
2011; Post of Zambia, 28 January 2011). 
20
 As industries were protected by high tariffs and often state support prior to liberalisation in the 1990s, the 
employment number was higher than economically necessary (Koyi, 2006:261). 
21
 Manmade fibre is chemically produced fibre created through technological means from chemicals or 
combinations of chemicals and natural materials (USITC, 2009:vi). 
22
 The clothes do not necessarily originate from UAE, but used as a middle station. Kwacha 2.4 million 
represents about USD 460, which is a low amount on a national scale. 
23
 Zambia’s major export destinations: Switzerland (58.9 per cent), China (14.4 per cent), followed by South 
Africa (11.9 per cent), the DRC (3.7 per cent), Zimbabwe (2.1 per cent) (CSOZ, 2011:10). 
24
 The FNDP is divided into sectors of the economy. This paper will only look at plans and strategies relevant for 
the TC industry, located under two sectors in the FNDP, namely the Manufacturing sector and the Commerce 
and Trade sector. 
25
 A free trade agreement (FTA) is a trade treaty between two or more countries (MercaTrade Dictionary, 2009). 
Usually FTA is between two countries and meant to reduce or completely remove tariffs to trade. Most FTAs 
can also be reached in a trade bloc (ibid). 
26
 EPAs are being negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union, with six groups of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (African Union, 2012). EPAs replaced the Cotonou Agreement 
of preferences in January 2008, and aims to liberalise trade between African countries and the EU in line with 
the WTO (USITC, 2009:3-20). EPAs are aimed at promoting sustainable development and growth, poverty 
reduction, better governance and gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy (European 
Commission, 2010). 
27
 The SNDP also target processed food, engineering products, gemstones, leather and leather products, wood 
and wooden products, agriculture products such as coffee and tobacco (SNDP, 2011:142). 
28
 Other nationalities taking advantage of the MFEZ incentives include South Africa, Japan and Malaysia. For 
more information see “Investors Handbook 2011” (MCTI, 2011). 
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29
 An industrial park is a smaller version of an MFEZ with an area of minimum 15 acres (MCTI, 2011:13). 
30
 The conditions attached for participating in an MFEZ are that a business enterprise cannot within a MFEZ 
carry out activities that is not authorised by permit or licence, and a business enterprise may according to its 
license, produce for both export or local market, any goods or services specified in the license (MCTI, 2011:11). 
31
 The author was given the MFEZ Master Plan for the Lusaka East on a flash drive from the Lusaka City 
Council. Unfortunately, the document did not open. 
32
 The North South Corridor promotes regional integration in east and southern Africa; was established in 2009 
with member states, business and civil society organisations working within the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite. For more information see TradeMark Southern Africa (2012). 
33
 Zambia permits unlimited imports of second-hand clothing (Hansen, 2000:238-240). Zambia imposes a 25 per 
cent tariff on imported new and used apparel imports. Nevertheless, imported used apparel has so little value in 
the country of supply that these articles are imported at little or no cost (ibid) 
34
 The epicentre of export-oriented apparel production has been in East Asia, including countries such as China, 
India, Bangladesh and Taiwan.  
35
 For more information on the destructive impact of European cotton subsidies on African cotton farmers see the 
webpage Fair Politics (2009). 
36
 Chinese subsidies were estimated to be USD 1.96 billion in 2009/10. For more information on the Chinese 
cotton subsidies see the report “Production and Trade Policies affecting the cotton industry” by the Secretariat of 
the International Cotton Advisory Committee (2010). 
37
 Introducing protectionist policies for TC in Zambia could in theory help the industry get on its feet before 
competing on the global market. Protectionist policies may include measures such as subsidised cotton, export 
taxes on cotton, and tariffs on textiles and clothing imported into Zambia. 
38
 Two Zambian companies have exported to USA under AGOA: Unity Garments and Zambia-China 
Mulungushi Textiles (USITC, 2009:4-77). 
39
  The multi-fibre provision allows textile producers in AGOA countries to source their raw materials from other 
countries and still maintain their preferential access to the American market (AGOA Civil Society Forum, 2011). 
40
 Sixty per cent of the world's buttons are made in the Chinese town Qiaotou, producing 15 billion buttons a 
year in addition to manufacturing eighty per cent of the world's zips, representing 124,000 miles of zip each year 
(enough to stretch five times round the globe or half way to the moon) (The technology eZine, undated). In this 
sense it will not be feasible for Zambia to produce buttons and zips. 
41
 Preferential loans means in this context that loans given are conditional in the sense of being tied to Chinese 
companies, which are obliged to use Chinese products for the projects (Corkin, 2008; cited in Kragelund and van 
Dijk, 2009:86) 
42
 CADFund provide management, consulting and financial advisory services for all types of Chinese 
enterprises, to promote economic cooperation between China and African countries and to advise Africa’s 
economic development (Grimm et al, 2011:18). 
43
 In comparison CADFund invested in pilot economic zones in Nigeria, Mauritius and Egypt (Brautigam and 
Xiaoyang, 2011:34) 
44
 Other pilot provinces include the Copperbelt, the Southern Province and in the Eastern Province (FNDP, 
2006:37). 
45
 By comparison, these are some of the previous records of Chinese companies in Zambia: Bastholm and 
Kragelund (2009) recorded more than 200 state-owned and private Chinese companies. Carmody and 
Hampwaye (2010:86) argue Chinese investments cover over 140 officially projects in various sectors. 
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46
 This was also confirmed by literature, arguing that also Chinese investments in agriculture is difficult to 
quantify, given the numerous unrecorded small-scale investments and because Chinese individuals does not 
always do what they register for (Yan and Sautman, 2010:315,316). During fieldwork, the researcher was in 
contact with the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA). After handing in a question sheet, the ZRA answered about 
a week later that the institution was not in a position to provide an overview over Chinese investments and 
companies, TC trade statistics or tax revenue from the TC sector. The ZRA advised the researcher to contact the 
ZDA for this type of information. 
47
 The Chipata Cotton Company Limited in Easter Province, was a ginnery joint venture between the Chinese 
company Qingdao Textile Company Limited and the Indian/Zambian company Nyimba Group of Companies 
Limited of Eastern Province, set to produce cotton and its by-products (Daily Mail Zambia, 10 November 2003). 
Chipata Cotton Company was established as a response to the Zambian government’s encouragement of rural 
development (Mwanawina, 2008:18). 
48
 Chitenge is very versatile, and used for as a wrap to protect clothes, baby carriers, dresses, men’s suits and 
many other household uses (Kabwe Business News, 2010). 
49
 Similar to out-grower schemes under Dunavant Cotton, providing credit to farmers, access to seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides; in return the cotton produced by farmers are bought by the company providing inputs. 
50
 Wyler Team International Corporation is an agent of the retail giant Wal-Mart. 
51
 Undercapitalisation refers to a situation where a company has insufficient capital in relation to its current or 
expected activity (Encyclo Online Encyclopedia, 2011). 
52
 Wages paid to both permanent and casual workers at the ZCMT were well below the amount for a basic need 
basket (Brooks, 2010:121). The basic need basket is calculated by the Jesuit College of Theological Reflection 
(JCTR), and set to require Kwacha 917,140 per month to cover the basic costs of essential food and to live with a 
decent healthy lifestyle for an average sized family of six living in Kabwe (JCTR, 2006).  
53
 The airport recently changed name to Kenneth Kaunda Airport. 
54
 The other industries and services include: international trade centre exhibition; international logistics centre; 
business and luxury hotels; up-market residence development; building materials; wholesale markets; food 
processing; bonded warehouse; shopping mall; and home appliances assembly (MOFCOM, 13 May 2011). 
55
 Companies investing in MFEZs are freed from tax from dividends for five years from the first year of first 
declaration of dividends; 0 per cent corporate tax for five years from the first year of profits; 50 per cent of profit 
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